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CHAPTER 4 
Evidence 
SURVEY STAFFt 
§4.1. Polygraph Evidence-Admissibility in Criminal Prosecutions. (> 
Courts in many jurisdictions have held that polygraph evidence should 
not be admitted in any circumstances.1 In other jurisdictions courts 
have allowed polygraph evidence to be admitted in criminal prosecu-
tions provided the parties agreed prior to examination that the results 
of the test would be introduced. 2 In Commonwealth v. Fatalo 3 the Su-
preme Judicial Court adopted the view that polygraph evidence was 
not admissible in criminal prosecutions because the polygraph had not 
yet achieved general acceptance by the community of scientists involved.4 
Eleven years later, however, in Commonwealth v. A ]uvenile,5 the Court 
changed its position on the admissibility of polygraph results. The 
Court noted that, while polygraph testing had not yet reached the gen-
eral acceptance standard required by Fatalo, the polygraph had ad-
vanced to the point where it could be of significant value in the criminal 
trial process if its admissibility was confined to carefully defined cir-
cumstances.6 Therefore, the Court held that the results of a defendant's 
t NELSON G. Ap]OHN, JOHN 'D. DONOVAN, JR., CLOVER M. DruNKWATER-LUNN, 
LOUISE M. GESSEL, BARBARA JANE LEVINE, THOMAS J. LYNCH, BARRY J. PALMER, and 
DANIEL E. WruGHT. 
§4.1. .. By Barry J. Palmer, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
LAW. 
1 See, e.g., Pulakis v. State, 476 P.2d 474, 479 (Alaska 1970); People v. Sweeney, 
46 Ill. App. 3d 858, 867, 361 N.E.2d 344, 351 (1977); People v. Ranes, 63 Mich. 
App. 498, 502, 234 N.W.2d 673, 676 (1975); Harrison v. State, 307 So. 2d 557, 562 
(Miss. 1975); State v. Steinmark, 195 Neb. 545, 548, 239 N.W.2d 495, 497 (1976); 
Warden, Nev. State Prison v. Lischko, 90 Nev. 221, 224, 523 P.2d 6, 8 (1974); State 
v. Montgomery, 291 N.C. 235, 243-44, 229 S.E.2d 904, 909 (1976); Commonwealth 
v. Gee, 467 Pa. 123, 141, 354 A.2d 875, 883-84 (1976); State v. Watson, 248 
N.W.2d 398, 399 (S.D. 1976); Robinson v. State, 550 S.W.2d 54, 59 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 1977); Jones v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 723, 725, 204 S.E.2d 247, 248 (1974). 
2 See, e.g., Robinson v. Wilson, 44 Cal. App. 3d 92, 103, 118 Cal. Rptr. 569, 576 
(1974); State v. McNamara, 252 Iowa 19, 29, 104 N.W.2d 568, 574 (1960); State 
v. Fields, 434 S.W.2d 507, 512-14 (Mo. 1968). 
3 346 Mass. 266, 191 N.E.2d 479 (1963). 
4 Id. at 270, 191 N.E.2d at 481. 
5 365 Mass. 421, 313 N.E.2d 120 (1974). 
6 Id. at 425,313 N.E.2d at 124. 
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polygraph examination may be admitted, at the discretion of the trial 
judge, provided: 
1) The examination is at the defendant's request.7 
2) The defendant agrees in advance to the admission of the test 
results regardless of outcome.1l 
3) The court informs the defendant that, to the extent of the 
agreement, he is waiving his Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination. !J 
4) The court determines such a waiver is voluntary.lo 
5) The comt makes a determination, after a close and searching 
inquiry, that the polygraph examiner is qualified, that the defendant 
is fit for such examination, and that the examination methods are 
proper,u 
The decision in A Juvenile left unresolved many questions regarding 
the use of polygraph results. For example, the Court did not state for 
what purpose the polygraph results could be used but rather merely 
noted that the test results should be "considered with all other evi-
dence." 12 In two cases decided during the Survey year, Commonwealth 
v. Vitello 13 and Commonwealth v. Moynihan,14 the Court directly ad-
dressed this issue and determined that polygraph test results are admis-
sible only for the limited purpose of corroborating or impeaching the 
defendant's testimony.lU 
In Vitello the defendant was charged with armed robbery.16 Prior 
to trial, he requested the court's permission to take a polygraph examina-
tion at the state's expense for the purpose of introducing the results 
at trial.17 The defendant agreed to allow the test results to be admitted 
into evidence even if the results proved unfavorable. The defendant 
took the examination and the prosecution offered the unfavorable poly-
graph results into evidence as part of the prosecution's main case. The 
trial judge admitted the evidence and the defendant was found guilty. IS 
In Moynihan the defendant was also charged with armed robbery and 
a polygraph examination was administered. The defendant requested 
7 ld. at 430-31, 313 N.E.2d at 126. 
8 ld. at 431, 313 N.E.2d at 126-27. 
9 ld. at 431-32,313 N.E.2d at 127. 
10 ld. 
11 ld. at 426, 313 N.E.2d at 124. 
12 ld. at 431, 313 N.E.2d at 127. 
13 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2603, 381 N.E.2d 582. 
14 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2654, 381 N.E.2d 575. 
15 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2632, 381 N.E.2d at 596. 
16 ld. at 2603, 381 N.E.2d at 584. 
17 ld. at 2604, 381 N.E.2d 584. 
18 ld. at 2603-04,381 N.E.2d 584. 
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the examination for the purpose of introducing the results at trial.19 
The results of the test were favorable to the defendant. The trial court 
denied the defendant's request to introduce the polygraph results as 
independent evidence. Instead, the trial court ruled that the results 
were admissible only to corroborate the defendant's testimony.20 Con-
sequently, the defendant was required to take the witness stand in order 
to introduce the polygraph results. As a result of the defendant taking 
the stand, the prosecutor was able to introduce evidence of the defend-
ant's long record of criminal convictions.21 The defendant was con-
victed of armed robbery. 
The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the conviction in Vitello but 
upheld the conviction in Moynihan for reasons it set forth in Vitello.22 
The Court, in clarifying the purpose for which the results of a polygraph 
examination may be admitted, weighed three factors: (1) the nature of 
the polygraph method, (2) the pertinent rules of evidence, and (3) 
policy.23 In so dOing, the Court initially observed that while it was an 
appropriate time to elaborate upon A Juvenile's holding that polygraph 
results could be admitted in carefully defined circumstances, no further 
evidence had been submitted on the question of scientific reliability or 
acceptability of the polygraph. 24 Consequently, the Court accepted as 
still valid its finding in A Jwvenile that the polygraph had not yet reached 
the "general acceptance" standard of Fatalo. 25 Nevertheless, the Court 
in Vitello conducted a detailed review of the polygraph method. 
In considering the nature of the polygraph method, the Court noted 
that the polygraph's underlying premise-that conscious lying can be 
detected by measuring involuntary physiological changes-is based on 
the assumption of "a regular relationship between lying and certain 
emotional states, and a regular relationship between emotional states 
and changes in the body." 26 It observed that the validity of these 
assumptions has been questioned. 27 In addition, the Court emphasized 
that in order for the polygraph to be effective the subject must be 
instilled with a belief that the polygraph is infallible and must be con-
cerned about the possibility of detection.28 The Court concluded that 
19 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at , 381 N.E.2d at 58l. 
20ld. 
21 ld.; see C.L. c. 233, § 2l. 
22 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2632, 381 N.E.2d at 596. 
23 ld. at 2608, 381 N.E.2d at 586. 
241d. 
25 ld. 
26 ld. at 2609-10, 381 N.E.2d at 586. 
27 ld. See, e.g., Skolnick, Scientific Theory and Scientific Evidence: An Analysis 
of Lie Detection, 70 YALE L.J. 694,700 (1961). 
28 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2612-13, 381 N.E.2d at 587-88. 
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the success of the polygraph is almost completely dependent upon the 
skill of the polygraph examiner 29 and is highly dependent upon the 
mental attitude and beliefs of the subject.3o The Court noted that if a 
subject does not believe in the infallibility of the process or is uncon-
cerned about the outcome, the polygraph procedure is seriously com-
promised.31 
With these considerations as to the effectiveness of polygraph ex-
aminations in mind, the Court reviewed basic evidentiary principles in 
order to determine whether the results of a polygraph test should be 
admissible. The Court observed that when evidence consists of expert 
testimony the expert must be qualified in the subject of his testimony.32 
Additionally, the Court stated that when the expert's opinion is based 
on a newly developed body of scientific lrnowledge, the reliability of 
the body of lrnowledge must also be substantiated.33 The Court none-
theless concluded that failure to achieve the Fatalo standard of general 
acceptance need not preclude the use of the polygraph in view of its 
unique potential as a tool of justice.34 Rather, the Court indicated that 
the circumstances in which polygraph test results would be admissible 
could be delineated by balancing certain policy considerations. 
The first policy consideration noted by the Court was that polygraph 
evidence may confuse and prejudice the jury because the polygraph may 
assume "mystic infallibility" in the eyes of the jury.35 A second and 
related concern was that the polygraph may usurp the jury's role as a 
fact finder. The Court recognized the possibility that the jury would 
be so influenced by the polygraph evidence that it might abdicate its 
responsibility as an independent fact finder.36 The Court also observed 
that the "appearance of justice and the preservation of the perception 
that conviction rests on the judgment of one's peers" may be compromised 
by the use of polygraph evidence.37 A third consideration weighed by 
the Court was the consumption of time and trial resources by the use 
of polygraph evidence. The Court noted that extensive use of the poly-
graph would place a burden on the trial system.38 The burden would 
result both from the time needed to question and cross-examine wit-
nesses at trial and from the time needed by judges to ascertain that 
29 Id. at 2618, 381 N.E.2d at 590. 
30Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 2620, 381 N.E.2d at 59!. 
33 Id. at 2621, 381 N.E.2d at 59!. 
34 Id. at 2622-23, 381 N.E.2d at 592. 
35 Id. at 2624,381 N.E.2d at 592-93. 
36 Id. at 2626, 381 N.E.2d at 593. 
37 Id. at 2626-27, 381 N.E.2d at 593-94. 
38 Id. at 2627, 381 N.E.2d at 594. 
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the subject was amenable to testing, that past conditions were proper, . 
and that the polygraph examiner was fully qualified.3D 
After reviewing the relevant policy considerations, the Court consid-
ered the approaches other jurisdictions have taken with respect to the 
use of polygraph evidence. Many courts have concluded that polygraph 
evidence should not be admitted under any circumstances.40 At the 
other extreme, one jurisdiction has allowed polygraph results into evi-
dence even without prior agreement of the parties.41 Several jurisdic-
tions, however, occupy intermediate positions. It was on these inter-
mediate positions that the Vitello Court focused its review. 
Some courts have invoked a notion of estoppel and held that a de-
fendant who stipulated beforehand that the polygraph operator was 
qualified and that the procedure was accurate cannot later object to the 
introduction of unfavorable results.42 The Vitello Court found this 
reasoning unpersuasive. If the polygraph test is unreliable, the Court 
noted, the presence of a prior stipulation or agreement will not imbue 
the polygraph results with reliability and probative value.43 Another 
intermediate approach, adopted by a number of courts,44 imposes restric-
tions on admi~sibility notwithstanding the prior stipulation or agreement 
of the parties. The Vitello Court referred to State v. Valdez 45 as the 
seminal case for this position.46 Valdez held that pursuant to an agree-
ment polygraph results are admissible to corroborate other evidence of 
the crime and to impeach or corroborate the defendant's testimony.47 
The Valdez Court, however, imposed a number of conditions, including 
reserving to the trial judge the decision of admissibility notwithstanding 
the agreement.48 
While noting that the Valdez formulation avoided the more serious 
shortcomings of the "estoppel" decisions, the Vitello Court was not pre-
pared wholly to adopt the Valdez approach.49 Instead, the Court ana-
39 rd. 
40 rd. at 2628, 381 N.E.2d at 594. See cases listed in note 1 supra. 
41 Id. at 2628, 381 N.E.2d at 594. See State v. Dorsey, 88 N.E. 184, 185, 539 
P.2d 204, 205 (1975). 
42 See cases listed in note 2 supra. 
43 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2629-30, 381 N.E.2d at 595. 
44 See, e.g., State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 283, 371 P.2d 894, 900 (1962); State 
v. Lassley, 218 Kan. 758, 760, 545 P.2d 383, 385 (1976); State v. McDavitt, 62 N.J. 
36,46-47,297 A.2d 849, 854-55 (1972); State v. Soue!, 53 Ohio St. 2d 123, 132-33, 
372 N.E.2d 1318, 1323 (1978); State v. Stanislawski, 62 Wis. 2d 730, 741-43, 216 
N.W.2d 8, 13-14 (1974). 
45 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962). 
46 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2631, 381 N.E.2d at 595. 
47 91 Ariz. at 283, 371 P.2d at 900. 
48 rd. 
49 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2632, 381 N.E.2d at 596, 
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lyzed what it considered to be three possible roles for polygraph evidence 
in criminal cases: use of unfavorable polygraph results as independent 
evidence of guilt;50 use of favorable polygraph evidence as independent 
evidence of innocence;51 and use of polygraph results to impeach or 
corroborate the defendant's testimony.52 The Court determined that 
most policy considerations-confusion and prejudice of the jury, intru-
sion into the jury's function, and use of trial resources-outweighed the 
probative value of polygraph results when used as independent evidence 
of either guilt 53 or innocence. 54 The Court concluded, however, that 
different considerations apply when polygraph results are used to im-
peach or corroborate the defendant's testimony.55 Referring to the poly-
graph examiner as a potential "expert character witness," 56 the Court 
compared the use of polygraph evidence for this purpose with the use 
of character evidence.57 The Court noted that the limited use of poly-
graph evidence would serve several policy goalS.58 First, if the results 
are favorable, a defendant with a criminal record may elect to testify 
where he otherwise would not. The defendant may determine that the 
results of the polygraph would outweigh the prejudicial impact of his 
criminal history. Thus, the court stated, the capacity of the trial process 
to determine the truth will be Significantly enhanced by encouraging 
defendants to testify.59 Moreover, the Court noted that the polygraph 
method arguably would prOVide the jury with a more direct method for 
judging the credibility of a witness than would the introduction of past 
criminal behavior.60 Also, in the case where an innocent defendant is 
erroneously determined by the polygraph examiner to have lied, the 
defendant may protect himself from the damaging evidence by forfeiting 
his right to take the stand.61 Therefore, the Court determined that 
polygraph results will remain admissible but only for the limited purpose 
of impeaching or corroborating the defendant's testimony.62 
1I0ld. 
51 ld. at 2634, 381 N.E.2d at 597. 
112 ld. at 2635, 381 N.E.2d at 597. 
53 ld. at 2632-33, 381 N.E.2d at 596. 
1i4 ld. at 2634-35, 381 N.E.2d at 597. 
MId. at 2636, 381 N.E.2d at 597. 
1i6 Id. at 2636, 381 N.E.2d at 598. 
117 ld. 
118 ld. at 2637, 381 N.E.2d at 598. 
591d. 
60 Id. 
61 ld. at 2638,381 N.E.2d at 598. The Court noted that a voir dire hearing could 
be held prior to the defendant's main case to determine whether or not the poly-
graph results would be admissible. This hearing would eliminate the possibility of 
the defendant taking the stand only to have the polygraph results excluded for 
reasons within the discretion of the judge. Id. at 2639, 381 N.E.2d at 599. 
62 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2654, , 381 N.E.2d 575, 581; 1918 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
2603, 2632, 381 N.E.2d 582, 596. 
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The question arising out of Vitello and Moynihan is whether the line 
drawn by the Court-allowing polygraph results to impeach or cor-
roborate but not as independent evidence-can withstand analysis. The 
Court placed great emphasis on the dependence of the integrity of the 
polygraph method upon the subject's concern for the possibility of a 
deception being detected.63 Yet under the Vitello-Moynihan decisions 
any concern over detection is eliminated. Previously, a defendant 
applied for the polygraph examination under an agreement that the 
results would be admissible regardless of the outcome. The defend-
ant knew that an unfavorable result would be introduced by the 
prosecution and, consequently, if he were lying he would be concerned 
with the possibility of detection. Under the present system, however, 
the guilty defendant has nothing to lose by taking the polygraph exam. 
If the results are favorable he can take the stand and the evidence 
will be admissible. If the results are unfavorable he can keep the 
evidence out by not testifying. Moreover, according to the Court's 
analysiS of the polygraph method,tl4 the defendant's awareness of his 
nothing-to-Iose position gives him a much better chance to elicit favor-
able results. 
In view of this situation, in which favorable polygraph results can 
help a defendant but unfavorable results can be excluded, it would not 
be surprising if there is a Significant increase in the number of defend-
ants applying to the court for polygraph examinations. Such an in-
crease in defendant requests for polygraph examinations will be a drain 
on judiCial resources as the trial courts are required under A Juvenile 
to supervise closely the administration of the examination. Ironically, 
one of the reasons the Vitello Court advanced for refusing to allow 
polygraph results to be used as independent evidence of innocence or 
guilt was its concern over the consumption of time and trial resources.65 
In addition to the "windfall" given to the guilty defendant by giving 
him a chance to pass the polygraph examination without fear of failing 
it, the Vitello-Moynihan decisions will have an impact on the innocent 
defendant. Under the holding of A Juvenile it appeared that the de-
fendant could introduce the results of the polygraph without taking the 
witness stand. This is no longer true. The defendant must now testify 
in order to introduce the favorable polygraph results to corroborate his 
testimony. This ruling will force a difficult choice upon the innocent 
defendant who has a long criminal record. Once the defendant takes 
the stand his prior record will be introduced by the prosecution, with 
63 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2613, 381 N .E.2d at 588. 
64 ld. 
65 ld. at 2626-27, 381 N.E.2d at 593-94. 
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the consequent risk that such a record may have more of an impact on 
the jury than the favorable polygraph results. 
Obviously, the Court in Vitello and Moynihan attempted to reach a 
middle ground on the use of polygraph results. On one hand, the 
Court was troubled by the polygraph's lack of general scientific accept-
ance and desired to limit the use of polygraph results. On the other 
hand, the Court was reluctant to exclude completely polygraph evidence 
owing to the highly probative value of the results and the enormous 
potential of the polygraph method. In balancing these interests, how-
ever, the Court has reached a somewhat troubling compromise. 
Several other decisions regarding the use of polygraph results decided 
during the Survey year illustrate the difficulties courts faced in inter-
preting and applying the compromise that Vitello had reached. In 
Commonwealth v. Allen 66 the trial had taken place prior to the Vitello-
Moynihan decisions, and the trial court had admitted unfavorable poly-
graph results, which were a part of the prosecution's main case.67 The 
state contended that the admission was harmless error as the defendant 
had later taken the stand and the results would have been admissible 
at that point for impeachment purposes.68 The Supreme Judicial Court 
rejected this argument on two grounds. First, the Court noted that the 
defendant might have chosen not to testify had it not been for the 
unfavorable polygraph results introduced by the prosecution.69 Second, 
the Court found that the defendant was entitled to a limiting instruction 
explaining that the polygraph testimony is admitted solely for the pur-
pose of corroborating or impeaching the defendant's testimony.70 
In Commonwealth v. Foley 71 the Appeals Court was required to 
reverse, as the trial again had taken place prior to Vitello and Moynihan, 
and the trial court had admitted unfavorable polygraph results as in-
dependent evidence. The Appeals Court noted that because the de-
fendant may choose to testify at the second trial the polygraph results 
may be introduced for limited purposes.72 Because of this possibility, 
the court addressed two additional objections by the defendant. First, 
the defendant objected to the trial court's allowing the polygraph ex-
aminer to testify as to the statistical reliability of the polygraph.73 Sec-
ond, the defendant objected to the trial judge's jury instruction compar-
66 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 863, 387, N.E.2d 553. 
67 Id. at 864, 387 N.E.2d at 554-55. 
68 Id. at 867, 387 N.E.2d at 556. 
69Id. 
70Id. 
71 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 999, 389 N.E.2d 762. 
72 Id. at 1001, 389 N.E.2d at 765. 
73 Id. at 1002, 389 N.E.2d at 765. 
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ing polygraph experts to ballistic experts, surgeons, architects, engineers, 
and handwriting experts. 74 The appellate court agreed with the de-
fendant's objections in both instances. The court found it impermissible 
to allow the polygraph examiner to testify as to the test's statistical 
reliability. Such statistics, the court noted, are of questionable reli-
ability, invade the province of the jury, and are of minimal probative 
value. 75 As for the jury charge, the court cautioned trial judges against 
treating polygraph examiners on a par with scientific experts in more 
established fields.76 
In Commonwealth v. Moore 77 the issue arose as to the use of poly-
graph results to impeach or corroborate the testimony of prosecution 
witnesses. In Moore the trial court excluded evidence of a polygraph 
test offered to impeach a prosecution witness.78 The Supreme Judicial 
Court specifically reserved the question of whether polygraph evidence 
is ever admissible to impeach a prosecution witness.79 Assuming, with-
out deciding, that such evidence may be admissible, the Court noted 
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the evi-
dence in the present case.80 
§4.2. Impeachment-Defendant's Right to Establish Bias-Juvenile 
Records and Evidence of Prior Arrest. '* The general rule in Massachu-
setts is that a defendant may not introduce into evidence juvenile 
records 1 or records of prior arrests 2 to impeach the credibility of an 
adverse witness. With the decision in Commonwealth v. Ferrara,3 
Massachusetts had recognized an exception to this rule where the de-
fendant is able to establish that such records have a rational tendency 
to show specific bias on the part of the witness.4 In Ferrara, the Su-
74 ld. at 1004, 389 N.E.2d at 766. 
75 ld. at 1002-03, 389 N.E.2d at 765. 
76 ld. at 1004, 389 N.E.2d at 766. 
77 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2334, 393 N.E.2d 904. 
78 ld. at 2341, 393 N.E.2d at 908. 
79 ld. at 2345, 393 N.E.2d at 910. 
80 ld. 
§4.2 ... By Thomas J. Lynch, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
LAW. 
1 C.L. c. 119, § 60 (juvenile records not admissible); cf. C.L. c. 233, § 21 
(records of convictions may be used to impeach credibility). See also Michelson v. 
United States, 335 U.S. 469, 482 (1948) (arrest records admissible in cross-examina-
tion of defendant's character witness); see generally LEACH & LlACOS, MASSACHUSETTS 
EVIDENCE 123 (4th ed. 1967). 
2 Commonwealth v. Nassar, 351 Mass. 37, 44-45, 218 N.E.2d 72, 78 (1966), 
appeal after remand, 354 Mass. 249, 237 N.E.2d 39; cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1039 
(1969 ) (reference to prior arrest prejudicial error). 
3 368 Mass. 182, 330 N .E.2d 837 (1975). See Krasnoo & Ottenberg, Evidence, 
1975 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 14.3, at 365-67. 
4 368 Mass. at 186-87, 330 N.E.2d at 841. 
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preme Judicial Court adopted the rationale of the United States Su-
preme Court decision in Davis v. Alaska 5 and declared that cross-exami-
nation on the issue of bias is an essential part of a defendant's constitu-
tional right to confront an adverse witness.6 As a result of Ferrara, the 
trial judge must decide, in light of each particular situation, if a juvenile 
record or prior arrest is relevant to the issue of bias. If there is a ra-
tional tendency to show bias, the defendant's right to full cross-examina-
tion outweighs the state policy of maintaining the confidentiality of 
juvenile records or prior arrests not resulting in conviction.7 
During the Survey year, the Massachusetts courts of appeal considered 
two cases stemming from the exclusion of juvenile records offered for 
purposes of impeachment. In Comrrwnwealth v. Santos,S the defendant, 
on trial for rape and related charges, attempted to impeach the credibility 
of the complainant by introducing her sealed juvenile records.9 During 
a lobby conference, the trial judge contacted the probation department, 
learned that. the record had been sealed, and then refused to admit the 
record.10 Subsequently, the defendant was convicted of rape and kid-
napping. 11 
On appeal the sole issue before the Supreme JudiCial Court was 
whether the defendant's right to confront and cross-examine an adverse 
witness was infringed by the trial judge's refusal to admit the com-
plainant's sealed juvenile record.12 The defendant argued that a gen-
eral attack on credibility is not materially different from an effort to 
establish specific bias or motive to prevaricate where credibility is a 
central issue in the trial,13 The Supreme JudiCial Court rejected this 
argument and held that a sealed juvenile record may be introduced only 
when the record is probative of bias or motive.14 The Court stated that 
neither Davis or Ferrara permits juvenile records to be admitted under 
all circumstances.15 Rather, both decisions require the trial judge to 
weigh several factors in deciding whether to admit juvenile records. 
The Santos Court set forth three factors to be considered in determin-
ing the probative value of juvenile records on the issue of bias. The 
/) 415 U.S. 308 (1974). 
6 368 Mass. at 189, 330 N .E.2d at 842 (citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 
405 (1965). 
7 368 Mass. at 190, 330 N.E.2d at 842-43 (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. at 
320). 
8 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 3221, 384 N.E.2d 1202. 
9 ld. at 3224, 384 N.E.2d at 1204. 
10 ld. at 3224-25, 384 N.E.2d at 1204. 
11 ld. at 3221-22, 384 N.E.2d at 1203. 
12 ld. at 3221, 384 N.E.2d at 1202. 
13 ld. at 3225, 384 N.E.2d at 1204. 
14 ld. at 3229, 384 N.E.2d at 1206; see note 21 infra. 
Iii ld. at 3226, 384 N.E.2d at 1204-05. 
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trial judge must consider the probationary status of the witness, any 
motive of the witness to divert suspicion from himself by means of his 
testimony, and any other motives for pleasing the prosecution with his 
testimonyY' In applying these criteria, the Santos Court found that the 
defendant's right to confront an adverse witness had not been violated. 
No evidence suggested that the complainant was on probation, was 
under suspicion for any crime, or had any reason to be unduly coopera-
tive with the prosecution.17 Furthermore, the sealing of the complain-
ant's juvenile record showed that she had not been convicted of a crime 
or adjudicated a delinquent at any time during the three years prior to 
the request that such record be sealed.18 Therefore, the Court con-
cluded that in the instant case the state's policy of securing the con-
fidentiality of juvenile records was clearly superior to the limited value 
of the records to impeach the credibility of the complainant.19 
The Santos decision is significant because it limits Ferrara to those 
situations in which a juvenile record is offered to show a witness's bias 
or motive. The defendant's effort to extend and apply the rationale of 
Ferrara to a general attack on the witness's credibility was rejected by 
the Court, even when credibility is a central issue at trial,2° Conse-
quently, a juvenile record remains admissible only on the narrow issue 
of bias or motive. 
With respect to the more narrow issue of the use of sealed juvenile 
records, the Court did not hold them inadmissible under all circumstances. 
By setting forth a three-part test for admissibility, the Court in Santos 
implied that there may be situations where such sealed records may 
be introduced.21 It appears, nevertheless, that a juvenile record which 
has passed judicial scm tiny and has been sealed in accordance with 
16 ld. at 3227-28, 384 N.E.2d at 1205. 
17 ld. at 3228, 384 N.E.2d at 1205-06. 
18 ld. at 3228, 384 N.E.2d at 1205; see C.L. c. 276, § 100B. 
19 ld. at 3229, 384 N .E.2d at 1206. 
20 ld. at 3225, 384 N.E.2d at 1206. 
21 Throughout its opinion the Court in Santos makes no distinction between 
sealed juvenile records and juvenile records generally. The holding, therefore, leaves 
open the possibility that a sealed record could be admissible under different circum-
stances. Most troubling is the Court's suggestion that if the witness were on proba-
tion for some other offense or had motives to please the prosecution, the sealed 
record might then also be admissible. See id. at 3228, 384 N.E.2d at 1205. Under 
the provisions of C.L. c. 276, § 100B, the sealing of a juvenile record would appear 
to be conclusive proof that the prosecution witness was no longer susceptible to 
pressure by means of that record. In effect, the record no longer exists. Thus, the 
Court in Santos could have based its decision on the mere fact that the records were 
sealed. An analysis under Ferrara would have been unnecessary and sealed juvenile 
records would have been excluded under all circumstances because a witness could 
never show a rational tendency toward witness bias. See also Commonwealth v. 
Cheek, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 649, 651, 373 N.E.2d 1161, 1163. 
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the relevant statute will seldom satisfy also the Santos test for admissi-
bility at trial. 
Pertinent to this aspect of the Santos decision is rule 609( g) of the re-
vised Proposed Rules of Evidence for Massachusetts.22 Rule 609(g) 
excludes all prior convictions-whether juvenile or otherwise-which 
have been sealed pursuant to the law of the jurisdiction where the 
original conviction was obtained. If adopted, this rule would remove 
any remaining ambiguity with respect to the admission of juvenile rec-
ords in Massachusetts. By excluding sealed records in all situations, 
this rule would accomplish directly what the Santos decision has ap-
parently accomplished indirectly. 
Later in the Survey year, the issue of admissibility of juvenile records 
arose in a situation similar to Santos. In Commonwealth v. Carty,23 the 
Appeals Court reversed a conviction for rape and kidnapping because 
the defendant was not permitted to introduce the complainant's juvenile 
record in his attempt to establish both bias and motive to prevaricate.24 
At the time of the alleged rape, the complainant was on probation after 
having been adjudicated a delinquent.25 When she later testified at 
trial, final hearings were pending concerning the possible revocation of 
her probation, and she was in the custody of the Division of Youth Serv-
ices.2o Furthermore, evidence was presented at trial that the complainant 
had used marijuana and had participated in an attempted car theft on 
the night of the alleged rapeP Offering the complainant's juvenile 
record, the defendant hoped to suggest that the complainant was lying 
during her testimony in order to disguise her actual conduct on the 
night in question and thereby gain favorable treatment in the pending 
probation revocation hearings.28 
In a terse opinion, the Appeals Court held that the exclusion of the 
complainant's juvenile record had infringed the defendant's rights under 
the confrontation clause and therefore reversed his convictions.29 Citing 
Ferrara and Davis, the Court in Carty found strong indications that the 
complainant may have fabricated the rape allegations in order to prevent 
revocation of her probation.30 The defendant, therefore, had made the 
22 Rule 609(g) states: "Sealed Records. Notwithstanding any other provision of 
this rule, no evidence of a conviction shall be used or admissible if the record of 
such has been sealed under the law of the Jurisdiction where it occurred." See K. 
HUGHES, 19 MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE, EVIDENCE 309-10 (Supp. 1978). 
23 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2425, 397 N.E.2d 1138. 
24 rd. at 2426, 397 N.E.2d at 1140. 
25 rd. at 2426-27, 397 N.E.2d 1139-40. 
26 rd. at 2427, 397 N.E.2d at 1140. 
27 rd. at 2425-26, 397 N.E.2d at 1139. 
28 rd. at 2426, 397 N.E.2d at 1140. 
29 rd. at 2427, 397 N.E.2d at 1140. 
30 rd. 
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required showing that the juvenile records had a rational tendency to 
suggest both bias and a motive to prevaricate. 
Like juvenile records, evidence of an adult's prior arrest may have a 
rational tendency to show bias where the testimony of an adverse wit-
ness may be influenced by charges pending against him. The rationale 
of Ferrara and Davis, factually limited to juvenile records, has been 
utilized to permit the introduction into evidence of prior arrests to show 
a witness's desire to please the prosecution.31 Even where there has 
been no express agreement between the witness and the prosecution, 
the defendant may attempt to use such evidence to raise an inference 
that the witness's testimony is affected by his motivation to obtain a 
lenient disposition of the pending charges.32 During the Survey year, 
there were several cases in which the defendant urged on appeal that 
his right to confront an adverse witness was infringed by the trial court's 
refusal to admit arrest records. 
In Comrrwnwealth v. Haywood 33 the defendant sought to introduce 
pending armed robbery and assault and battery charges against the 
prosecution's lead witness.34 During a voir dire, the trial judge con· 
cluded that the arrest record was irrelevant to the issue of bias or motive 
to prevaricate.35 The defendant subsequently was convicted of second-
degree murder.36 The Supreme Judicial Court, noting the defendant's 
right to show a witness's motives to seek favor with the prosecution, 
stated that juvenile or criminal records cannot remain confidential where 
they are relevant to the issue of bias.37 On the particular facts of the 
case, however, the Court held that t;he trial judge did not abuse his 
31 See Commonwealth v. Dougan, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 380, 388, 386 N.E.2d 1, 
5; Commonwealth v. Haywood, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 965, 971, 388 N.E.2d 965, 971. 
In the area of pending criminal charges against a witness, Ferrara simply lends 
additional weight to the defendant's right to cross-examine on the issue of bias 
where the witness has motives to seek favor with the prosecution. Commonwealth v. 
Ahearn, 370 Mass. 283, 287, 346 N.E.2d 907, 909-10 (1976) (citing Ferrara and 
Davis); see also Commonwealth v. Graziano, 368 Mass. 325, 330, 331 N.E.2d 808, 
811-12 (1975); Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687 (1931). 
32 Commonwealth v. Michel, 367 Mass. 454, 327 N.E.2d 720 (1975); see Giglio 
v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972) (prosecution required to reveal under-
standings or agreements with witness made to secure his testimony); Commonwealth 
v. Ellison, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2072, 2094, 379 N.E.2d 560, 570-71 (withholding 
of material evidence by the prosecution a denial of due process); cf. Alford v. United 
States, 282 U.S. 687 (1931) (abuse of discretion to refuse to permit cross-examina-
tion of prosecution witness concerning detention by federal authorities). 
33 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 965, 388 N.E.2d 648. 
34 Id. at 967-68, 388 N.E.2d at 651. 
3Il Id. at 968, 388 N .E.2d at 651. 
36 Id. at 967, 388 N.E.2d at 650. 
37 Id. at 970-71, 388 N.E.2d at 652; Commonwealth v. Dougan, 1979 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. 2453, 396 N.E.2d 978; see generally Commonwealth v. Graziano, 368 Mass. 325, 
331 N .E.2d 808 (1975); see LEACH & LIAcos, supra note 1, at 120-21. 
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discretion by excluding the records.3s On the night of the crime, the 
witness had identified the defendant as the assailant and had given other 
material information to the police.39 Three days later the witness gave 
a full statement to the police.40 The evidence offered by the defendant 
concerned an arrest which did not occur until one month after these 
two initial statements had been made.41 All the witness's statements 
after that arrest and his later testimony at trial were consistent with the 
pre-arrest statements.42 The trial judge reasoned-and the Supreme 
Judicial Court agreed-that the defendant would have to make some 
showing that the witness's testimony "was motivated by partiality for 
the Commonwealth or hostility toward the defendant" before the evi-
dence of prior arrests would be admitted.43 The Supreme Judicial Court 
found that the trial judge had acted properly within the scope of his 
discretion.44 
In Commonwealth v. Hogan 45 the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the 
decision of the Appeals Court 46 to reverse multiple convictions of three 
defendants.47 During cross-examination of the two crucial prosecution 
witnesses, the defendants offered evidence of pending indictments 
against each witness.4s After conducting a voir dire, the trial judge 
found that no promises of special treatment had been made.49 He thus 
excluded evidence of the indictments and refused to allow even general 
inquiry on the issue of promises, rewards, or inducements.5o The Ap-
peals Court held, inter alia, that the defendants were entitled to present 
evidence of the pending indictments as part of their right to cross-
examine on the issue of bias.51 While agreeing with the trial judge 
that the witnesses, in all likelihood, were not motivated by promises of 
special treatment, the court held that the defendants had a right to 
raise the issue for consideration by the jury. 52 In the court's view, since 
the testimony was critical to the prosecution's case, the exclusion of the 
impeaching evidence was prejudicial error.53 
3S 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 974, 388 N.E.2d at 654. 
39 Id. at 966, 388 N.E.2d at 650. 
40 Id. at 971, 388 N.E.2d at 652. 
41 Id. at 971-72, 388 N.E.2d at 652-53. 
42 Id. at 972-73, 388 N.E.2d at 653. 
43 Id. at 974, 388 N.E.2d at 653-54. 
44 Id. at 974, 388 N.E.2d at 654. 
45 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2453, 396 N.E.2d 978. 
46 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 447, 387 N.E.2d 158. 
47 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2454, 396 N.E.2d at 979. 
4S Id.; 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 451, 387 N.E.2d at 161. 
49 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 451, 387 N.E.2d at 161. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 454, 387 N.E.2d at 162. 
152 Id. 
58 Id. 
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In affirming the decision of the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court reiterated the rationale set forth by the court below.54 Even if 
the possibility of witness bias is "an unlikely one," the defendant has a 
right to explore the issue. 55 Where the possibility of bias exists, the jury 
, should determine whether a witness's testimony has heen affected by 
prosecutorial pressure.56 The Court distinguished Santos as an instance 
where the proffered juvenile records displayed "no possible hasis for a 
finding of prosecutorial threat to the witness's freedom." 57 Furthermore, 
the Court noted that in Haywood the witness's testimony was not af-
fected by bias since it remained substantially similar to the witness's 
statements made prior to an unrelated arrest.58 
Commonwealth v. Dougan 59 provides an excellent counterpoint to the 
decision in Hogan. While Hogan focused on the defendant's right to 
cross-examine on the issue of bias, Dougan emphasized that the trial 
judge still retains discretionary power to control the scope and extent 
of that cross-examination. In Dougan, the Supreme Judicial Court re-
instated jury verdicts which convicted three defendants of rape, kid-
napping, and related crimes 60 after the Appeals Court had overturned 
the convictions.61 After extensive cross-examination during the trial by 
defense counsel with respect to the witness's earlier arrest and subsequent 
guilty plea, the trial judge, acting sua sponte,62 refused to permit a 
question concerning the witness's awareness of the maximum penalty 
when he entered a guilty plea.63 The Appeals Court held, inter alia, that 
the defendants were entitled to present evidence of bias by questioning 
a crucial witness as to his knowledge of the maximum penalty for a fire-
arms charge at the time he pleaded guilty and agreed to cooperate with 
the prosecution. 64 The court concluded that, by refusing to allow the 
question, the trial judge abridged the defendant's right to show bias.65 
54 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2454, 396 N.E.2d at 979. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id.; see text at notes 8-21 and 33-41 supra. 
58 Id. 
59 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 380, 386 N.E.2d 1. 
60 Id. at 381-82, 386 N.E.2d at 3. 
61 1978 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 649, 376 N.E.2d 1255. 
62 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 389, 386 N.E.2d at 5. The Supreme Judicial Court 
suggested that it would have been better for the trial judge to permit the question 
since there was no objection from the commonwealth. As a discretionary decision, 
however, there was no error. Id. 
63 Id.; 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 652, 376 N.E.2d at 1257. There is a 
factual disorepancy between the Supreme Judicial Court and the Appeals Court 
opinions at this point. The Appeals Court seems to have assumed that the witness's 
testimony was obtained in exchange for a lenient sentence. The record showed-
and the Supreme Judicial Court took pains to point out-that the witness denied any 
connection between his testimony and the prior guilty/lea. 
64 1978 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 652, 376 N.E.2 at 1257. 
65 Id. 
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In reversing the Appeals Court decision, the Supreme Judicial Court 
found that the trial judge merely had restricted the scope of cross-
examination and, thus, had not abused his discretion.66 The jury had 
been sufficiently exposed to the matter during cross-examination, and the 
witness had denied any relationship between his earlier guilty plea and 
his present testimony.6i Contrary to the Appeals Court, the Supreme 
Judicial Court determined that the defendant had sufficient opportunity 
to reveal any bias resulting from the earlier guilty plea. The defendant 
had inquired on the issue, raised the matter for the jury's consideration, 
and then the trial judge, in his discretion, concluded that the inquiry had 
gone far enough. Thus, where the Court in Hogan focused on the 
defendant's right to explore fully possible bias arising from pending 
criminal charges, the Court in Dougan reasserted the trial judge's discre-
tionary power to control the scope of cross-examination once the issue 
of possible bias has been raised. 
The decisions of this Survey year display the continued vitality of the 
defendant's right to establish witness bias. If the defendant can meet 
the "rational tendency" test of Ferrara, the trial judge has no discretion 
to weigh probative value against prejudicial impact. The defendant is 
entitled, as part of rights under the confrontation clause, to present 
evidence of witness bias for consideration by the jury. 
§4.3. Impeachment-Prior False Accusations.o Massachusetts con-
sistently has prohibited impeachment of an adverse witness by the in-
troduction of evidence of his prior bad acts not resulting in a convic-
tion. l Such evidence is considered a specific example of reputation 
66 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 388-89, 386 N.E.2d at 5. 
6i ld. at 388, 386 N.E.2d at 5; see note 45 supra. 
§4.3 ... By Thomas J. Lynch, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
LAW. 
1 Commonwealth v. Binkiewicz, 342 Mass. 740, 754-56, 175 N.E.2d 473, 483-84 
(1961); Davidson v. Massachusetts Cas. Ins. Co., 325 Mass. 115, 123, 89 N.E.2d 
201,205 (1949); Commonwealth v. Schaffner, 146 Mass. 512, 515-16,16 N.E. 280, 
282-83 (1888). See K. HUGHES, 19 MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE, EVIDENCE § 238, at 
277-79 (settled law in Massachusetts that prior acts of misconduct other than con-
viction not admissible to impeach credibility); but see Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 
1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2176, 2180-81, 378 N.E.2d 987, 990-9 (rule against admission 
of prior bad acts not inflexible; may be cases where such evidence might be com-
petent). The Court in Bohannon cited for authority Miller v. Curtis, 158 Mass. 
127, 131, 32 N.E. 1039, 1040 (1893). The Court in Miller, however, stated that 
the general rule excluding specific acts to impeach a witness's character "has been 
adhered to with great strictness." It is difficult, moreove'r, to read Miller as con-
trolling authority when other decisions have clearly stated that prior bad acts are 
inadmissible on the issue of credibility. See, e.g., Conunonwealth, v .. Schaffner, 146 
Mass. at 515-16, 16 N.E. at 282-83 (rule against admission of priQr bad acts stated 
as settled law); Jones v. Commonwealth, 327 Mass. 491, 494, 99, N.E.2d 456, 458 
( 1951) (questions concerning membership in the Communist PaI'ty not admissible 
to impeach): Davidson v. Massachusetts Cas. Ins. Co., 325 Mass. at 123, 89 N.E. 
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evidence and thus a collateral matter beyond the permissible scope of 
cross-examination.2 During the Survey year, two decisions appear to 
have created an exception to this rule for a specific form of prior mis-
conduct: prior false accusations. Prior to these decisions, a judge retained 
no discretion to admit evidence of witness's prior bad acts. 3 By virtue 
of these two recent decisions, however, it now seems that the trial judge 
has discretionary power to admit evidence of misconduct which may 
be characterized as prior false accusations. 
In Commonwealth v. Bohannon,4 a prosecution for rape and related 
charges, the complainant was the only witness for the commonwealth. 
She testified on direct in a vague and confusing manner.5 On cross-
examination defense counsel sought to impeach her credibility. At a 
side-bar conference,6 counsel requested permission to examine the com-
plainant concerning unsubstantiated allegations of rape made by her as 
a result of earlier unrelated events. Counsel also offered hospital records 
to corroborate his line of inquiry.7 The trial judge, however, ruled that 
the defendant could not question the complainant with respect to her 
past conduct.!! This determination by the trial judge was the sole issue 
raised on appea1.9 
at 205-06 (reversing judgments for several reasons including improper admission 
of prior misconduct). Davidson is of further interest because the decision cites 
Miller for the proposition that specific evidence of prior misconduct is not admissible 
to show reputation. ld. 
2 It is important to distinguish between the rule allowing the trial judge dis-
cretion in the control of cross-examination and, the rule excluding evidence of prior 
bad acts. The trial judge, in controlling the extent and scope of cross-examination, 
may permit or foreclose questioning as the situation demands. See Commonwealth 
v. Franklin, 366 Mass. 284, 295-98, 318 N.E.2d 469, 472-74 (1974) (Tauro, C.J., 
dissenting). With respect to prior bad acts, however, the trial judge has no choice 
but to exclude such evidence. Prior bad acts are per se beyond the scope of cross-
examination both as a collateral matter and a specific example of reputation evidence. 
Commonwealth v. Binkiewicz, 342 Mass. at 755, 175 N.E.2d at 483-84; Common-
wealth v. Schaffner, 146 Mass. at 515-16, 16 N.E.2d at 283; see also Campbell v. 
Ashler, 320 Mass. 475, 481, 70 N.E.2d 302,305 (1946) (statement of general discre-
tionary rule with respect to cross-examination). See generally C. MCCORMICK, 
EVIDENCE § 42, at 82 (2d ed. 1972). 
3 See Commonwealth v. Binkiewicz, 342 Mass. at 755, 175 N.E.2d at 483-84; 
Commonwealth v. Roberts, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1302, 1314-17, 389 N.E.2d 989, 
996-97 (juxtaposition of selected prior convictions with questions concerning un-
related matters in effort to show propensity for violence was improper). 
4 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2176, 378 N.E.2d 987. 
5 ld. at 2177-78, 378 N.E.2d at 989. 
6 The Court applauded counsel for asking permission before pursuing a poten-
tially objectionable line of inquiry, particularly where the questions might elicit 
testimony about prior sexual conduct. ld. at 2179 n.2, 278 N.E.2d at 989 n.2; see 
text at note 17 infra. 
7 ld. at 2179, 378 N .E.2d at 990. 
8 The opinion does not disclose why the judge excluded this evidence. Quite 
clearly, the rule excluding prior bad acts would have been one legitimate reason. 
Also pertinent to the judge's decision, however, was the "rape-shield" statute. See 
17
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The Supreme Judicial Court held that the exclusion of this evidence 
denied the defendant the opportunity to present a full defense.1o Noting 
the critical relationship between the complainant's credibility and the 
issue of consent, the Court reasoned that evidence of prior false accusa-
tions, substantially the same as the charges in the present trial, could 
Significantly affect the complainant's credibility in the eyes of the jury.H 
The complainant's credibility was especially suspect where her direct 
testimony was inconsistent and confused.12 Because the determination 
of credibility rests exclusively with the trier of fact, the Court concluded 
that the defendant was entitled to introduce, as part of his right to 
present a full defense, evidence which may have had "a significant im-
pact on the issue of consent." 13 
The Court then expanded upon its basic rationale and highlighted 
two distinctive aspects of the facts in Bohannon.14 First, the Court em-
phasized the importance of the hospital records offered by the defendant 
to support his proposed questions. It cautioned, however, that where 
the inquiry may reveal past sexual conduct of a rape complainant, coun-
sel must present a clear factual basis for questions even remotely touch-
ing this subject.15 The hospital records were important for a related 
reason not stressed by the Court. One consistent objection to the use of 
prior accusations is the collateral issue of whether the allegations were, 
text and note at note 19 infra. Evidence of prior false accusations could be con-
strued as evidence of prior sexual conduct of the complainant and, thus, inadmis-
sible under the statute. 
9 Id. at 2179, 378 N.E.2d at 990. 
10 Id. at 2181, 378 N.E.2d at 990-91. At trial, defense counsel did not argue 
that the evidence was admissible as part of the defendant's right to present a full 
defense. The Court, however, scrutinized the record and allowed the point to be 
raised on appeal in order to avoid "a substantial miscarriage of justice." Id. at 
2181 n.4, 378 N .E.2d at 990-91 n.4. See Commonwealth v. Barton, 367 Mass. 515, 
517, 326 N.E.2d 885, 887 (1975). 
On appeal, the defendant also attempted to establish that the evidence was relevant 
on the issue of bias. A defendant may cross-examine as of right if the evidence 
is found to be probative of the issue of bias. Commonwealth v. Ferrara, 368 Mass. 
182, 330 N.E.2d 837 (1975); Commonwealth v. Haywood, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
965, 388 N.E.2d 648; Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974). The Court in 
Bohannon, however, found that the issue of bias was waived at the trial since 
counsel offered the evidence solely on the issue of credibility. 1979 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. at 2180 n.3, 378 N.E.2d at 990, n.3. 
11 Id. at 2182, 378 N.E.2d at 991. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. The obvious relevance of prior false accusations is to suggest that the 
witness is lying during the present testimony. A second IIlDre subtle object of such 
evidence is to impeach the care, powers of observation, and seriousness of purpose 
of the witness. Rather than suggest outright mendacity, counsel lJl8.y Simply wish 
to portray a witness who is hasty, careless, or unappreciative of the seriousness of 
a criminal accusation. 
14 Id. at 2182-83, 378 N.E.2d at 991. 
1Ii Id. 
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in fact, untrue.16 Without reliable proof that the allegations were false, 
the jury is forced to consider an additional and confusing issue. In 
Bohannon the hospital records did establish the false nature of the previ-
ous accusations 17 and thus vitiated any fear of jury confusion. 
The second factor highlighted by the Bohannon Court pertained to 
the so-called "rape-shield" statute enacted by the Massachusetts legisla-
ture in 1977.18 The statute is concerned specifically with the problem 
of victim harassment during cross-examination in rape trials and prohibits 
inquiry into past sexual conduct of the complainant except for very 
limited purposes.19 The Court found no conflict with this statute since 
the defendant's questions focused, not on the victim's earlier sexual 
activity or reputation for chastity, but rather on the lack of truth in her 
prior rape accusations.20 To ensure a proper interpretation of its deci-
sion, the Court reiterated its firm disapproval of "a legal tradition, estab-
lished by men, that the complaining woman in a rape case is fair game 
for character assassination in open court." 21 
A question which remained after Bohannon was whether the decision 
was limited to its facts or applied more generally to evidence of prior 
false accusations. The Supreme Judicial Court apparently answered this 
question in Commonwealth v. Sperrazza.22 In Sperrazza, a prosecution 
for murder and kidnapping, the defendant attempted to impeach the 
credibility of the only prosecution witness who placed the defendant at 
the scene of the two murders.23 During a bench conference, defense 
coun~el offered to prove that an allegedly false kidnapping report had 
been made by the witness approximately one year earlier.24 The trial 
16 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sperrazza, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2423, 2426, 396 
N.E.2d 449, 451 (doubt as to whether the prior kidnapping report was in fact 
falsely made); see generally MCCORMICK, supra n<;>te 2, § 42, at 82-83. An analogous 
situation is the use of records of prior convictions. The party offering the evidence 
need not prove the validity of the proceeding resulting in the conviction. The 
records themselves are conclusive proof, and there is no problem of jury confusion. 
C.L. c. 233, § 21. See Commonwealth v. Bowlen, 351 Mass. 655, 223 N.E.2d 391 
(1967), cerl. denied, 389 U.S. 916, reh. denied, 389 U.S. 1010. 
17 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2182-83, 378 N.E.2d at 991. 
18 ld. at 2183, 378 N.E.2d at 991-92; see G.L. c. 233, § 21B, as enacted by 
Acts of 1977, c. no. 
19 ct. Commonwealth v. Manning, 367 Mass. 605, 328 N.E.2d 496 (1975) (evi-
dence of prior sexual conduct admissible ·to impeach credibility and to establish 
consent) . The statute was enacted to prevent the use of evidence of sexual conduct 
during cross-examination in situations such as that presented by the Manning de-
cision. 
20 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2183, 378 N.E.2d at 991-92. 
21 ld. (citing Commonwealth v. Manning, 367 Mass. at 613-14, 328 N.E.2d at 
501 (Braucher, J., dissenting». 
22 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2423, 396 N.E.2d 449. 
23 ld. at 2426, 396 N.E.2d at 451. 
24 ld. 
19
Apjohn et al.: Chapter 4: Evidence
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1979
100 1979 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSE'ITS LAW §4.4 
judge refused the offer of proof and excluded the evidence.25 Subse-
quently, the defendant was convicted of four offenses-two counts of 
first-degree murder and two counts of kidnapping.u 
On direct appellate review,27 the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the 
convictions and distinguished Bohannon on its facts.28 The Court in 
Sperrazza indicated that the prior false accusations in Bohannon were 
held admissible because of "the special circumstances of that particular 
case." 2D Among other factors, the Court in Sperrazza noted that in 
Bohannon the witness was also the victim, her testimony was inconsistent, 
her consent was a central issue in the trial, and third-party records 
established the falseness of her earlier rape allegations.3o Finding no 
"similar features" in the instant case, the Court in Sperrazza held, inter 
alia, that exclusion of the proffered evidence was not an abuse of the 
trial judge's discretionary power to limit the scope of cross-examination 
on a collateral matter.31 
Sperrazza indicates that after Bohannon prior false accusations are a 
distinct category of prior witness misconduct to be considered apart from 
the general rule excluding such evidence. When prior false accusations 
are offered the trial judge may balance the probative value of the evi-
dence against the prejudiCial impact of either embarrassment of the 
witness or confusion of the jury. It remains unclear whether in the 
future the Supreme judicial Court will apply a discretionary standard 
to other types of prior bad acts offered for impeachment purposes. Of 
note in this regard are the Proposed Rules of Evidence for Massachu-
setts. If enacted, rule 608(b) would supplant the common law rule 
excluding prior bad acts not resulting in convictions and give the trial 
judge full discretion in admitting such evidence if relevant to the wit-
ness's character for truthfulness.32 Whether the Supreme Judicial Court 
will follow this proposed rule even before it is enacted cannot be 
determined. 
§4.4. Impeachment of Jury Verdicts-Juror Testimony." The tradi-
tional rule governing the admissibility of juror testimony to show juror 
25 ld. 
26 ld. at 2423, 396 N.E.2d at 450. 
27 G.L. c. 278, § 33E, as amended by Acts of 1979, c. 346, § 2. The 1979 
amendment limited the automatic right to expanded appellate review by the Su-
preme Judicial Court solely to convictions of first-degree murder. 
28 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2426, 396 N.E.2d at 451. 
29 ld. 
30 ld. 
31 ld., see note 2 supra. 
32 See HUGHES, supra note 1 (1978 West Supp. at 308). 
§4.4. .. By Louise M. Gessel, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETI'S 
LAw. 
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misconduct is that a juror cannot impeach his own verdict,l The Massa-
chusetts rule, however, does not absolutely prohibit juror testimony to 
impeach a verdict. ~ In the commonwealth, juror testimony is admissible 
to establish the existence of an extraneous influence on the jury, although 
it is not admissible to show the role which the extraneous influence 
played in the jury's decision.a During the Survey year, the Supreme 
Judicial Court applied this rule for the first time to statements made 
by a juror in the jury room concerning matters not in evidence at trial. 
The Court also presented procedural guidelines for procuring juror testi-
mony through post-verdict interviews.4 
In Commonwealth v. Fidler,a the defendant Fidler was convicted of 
armed robbery.u The defendant filed a motion for a new trial, supported 
by a juror's affidavit which recited four alleged instances of juror mis-
conduct during the jury's deliberations.' Two of the allegations of 
misconduct involved consideration by the jurors of matters which the 
judge had instructed them to disregard.~ The third and fourth allega-
tions in the affidavit charged that the jurors had been exposed to informa-
tion which was not introduced at the trial. One juror reportedly stated, 
"People who run around with guns like that ought to be afraid. Maybe 
someone might shoot at them, someday,"!l and another juror replied, 
"They did shoot at him last month and almost got him in Charlestown." 10 
At the hearing on the motion for a new trial, the trial judge denied 
the motion, refUSing to consider the juror's affidavit or to take oral testi-
1 See McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267 (1915). See generally 8 J. WIG-
MORE, EVIDENCE § 2354 (McNaughton e.d. 1961) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE]; 
R. Carlson and S. Sumberg, Attacking Jury Verdicts: Paradigms for Rule Revision, 
1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 247 (1977). This rule, known as the "Mansfield Rule," was 
first articulated by Lord Mansfield in Vaise v. Delaval, 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (K.B. 
1785) and has been followed by most jurisdictions in the United States. See list 
of jurisdictions in WIGMORE, supra, § 2354, at 702 n.2. The policy behind the rule 
is to protect the jury system by preventing the harassment of jurors by the losing 
party, the destruction of frankness and freedom in jury deliberations, and jury 
tampering and by promoting finality and confidence in jury verdicts. Government 
of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 523 F.2d 140, 148 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 917 
(1976); Commonwealth v. Fidler, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 240, 243-44, 385 N.E.2d 
513,516; Note, Impeachment of Jury Verdicts, 53 MARQ. L. REV. 258, 261 (1970). 
2 Commonwealth v. Fidler, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 240, 244-45, 385 N.E.2d 513, 
516. See Woodward v. Leavitt, 107 Mass. 453 (I871). 
3 107 Mass. at 466; 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 245, 385 N.E.2d at 516. 
4 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 251-54, 385 N.E.2d at 519-20. 
5 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 240, 385 N.E.2d 513. 
6 Facts appear in Commonwealth v. Fidler, 1978 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 65, 
65-68, 371 N.E.2d 1381, 1383-84. 
7 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 241-42, 385 N.E.2d at 515. 
8 Id. at 241, 385 N.E.2d at 515. 
9 Id. at 242, 385 N.E.2d at 515. 
lOld. 
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mony.ll On appeal,12 the Appeals Court ruled that the defendant must 
be granted a new hearing on the motion for a new trial to determine 
whether the jurors had been exposed to objective extrinsic facts about 
the defendant that were not introduced at trial but that would tend 
to prejudice the defendant.1s The commonwealth appealed to the Su-
preme Judicial Court, arguing that the trial judge's refusal to accept the 
affidavit was mandated by the rule prohibiting use of juror testimony 
to impeach jury verdicts.14 The commonwealth also asked the Court to 
address the issue of what constituted the proper procedure for conduct-
ing post-verdict interrogation of jurors by litigants or counseP5 
The Supreme Judicial Court agreed with the Appeals Court that a 
new hearing should be held but limited the scope of that hearing.16 
The Court stated that the trial judge was correct in refusing to consider 
the portions of the affidavit concerning juror discussion of matters they 
were instructed to disregard, since such discussions are part of the 
internal decision-making process of jury deliberations,17 The Court also 
agreed with the trial judge'S refusal to consider the general comment 
made concerning "people who run around with guns." 18 This statement, 
the Court said, may well have been an expression of that juror's view 
of the evidence presented at triaJ.19 The Court did find, however, that 
the statement that the defendant had been shot at in Charlestown 
constituted information extraneous to the triapo According to Massa-
chusetts law, a juror may testify to the existence of extraneous facts 
that might influence the jury.21 The Supreme Judicial Court remanded 
the case for a limited hearing to determine whether the statement in 
fact was made, and if so, whether it may have constituted an "extraneous 
disturbing influence." 22 
The Fidler Court based its decision on the case of Woodward v. 
Leavitt,23 which established the Massachusetts rule regarding juror testi-
mony. The Woodward Court held that juror testimony is admissible 
to show the existence of an improper influence on the jury, but not 
11 Id. at 243, 385 N.E.2d at 515. 
12 1978 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 65, 371 N.E.2d 1381. 
13 Id. at 76-78, 371 N.E.2d at 1387-88. 
14 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 243, 385 N.E.2d at 515. 
15 Id. at 240-41, 385 N.E.2d at 515. 
16 Id. at 241, 385 N.E.2d at 515. 
17 Id. at 248, 385 N.E.2d at 517. 
18 Id. at 248, 385 N.E.2d at 518. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 249, 385 N.E.2d at 518. 
21 Id. at 245, 385 N.E.2d at 516; 107 Mass. at 466 (1871). 
22 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 249-50, 385 N.E.2d at 518. 
23 107 Mass. 453 (1871); 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 250-51, 385 N.E.2d at 518-19. 
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to show how the improper influence affected the jury's deliberations.24 
Although the Woodward Court did not specify how the line between 
the two categories of juror testimony was to be drawn, it did imply 
that all discussions in the jury room are a part o~ the deliberation 
process, and, therefore, evidence of such discussions would be inad-
missible.25 The Woodward rule, as the Fidler Court perceived it, 
permitted the introduction of evidence of unauthorized views of sites 
by jurors, of improper communications to the jurors by third persons, 
and of the presence of a paper or document in the jury room that was 
not introduced as evidence.26 The Fidler Court interpreted this rule as 
allowing a juror to testify to the existence of statements of fact made 
by another juror in the jury room, if those facts had not been introduced 
at the triaP7 The Court reasoned that if the facts had been communi-
cated to the jury by a third party, the communication would be an 
extraneous influence and provable by juror testimony under the W ood-
ward rule. The Court saw no valid distinction between extraneous facts 
introduced by a juror and those communicated to the jury by a third 
person.28 
In reaching its decision, the Court balanced the competing objectives 
of preserving the stability of jury verdicts by keeping deliberations in-
violate and of achieving a just result between the litigating parties.29 
It reasoned that "[ w ] here a verdict is the product of misconduct based 
on extraneous matter, an inflexible rule that bars the best evidence of 
24 107 Mass. at 466. The Court said,. "A juryman may testify to any facts bear-
ing upon the question of the existence of the disturbing influence, but he cannot 
be permitted to testify how far that influence operated upon his mind." ld. 
25 See id. at 467. The Court stated, 
[Wjhere the cause which is alleged to have. prevented a fair trial is misconduct 
or partiality on the part of a juror, and testimony of his acts or declarations out-
side the jury room has been introduced for that purpose, his testimony in direct 
denial or explanation of those facts is admissible. [But this rule] cannot ... be 
extended to allow the same or other jurors to testify to the part which they 
took, or the motives which influenced them, in their private deliberations. 
ld. (emphasis added). 
In a later decision, Commonwealth v. Meserve, 156 Mass. 61,30 N.E. 166 (1892), 
the Court interpreted Woodward as establishing a hard and fast rule that no juror 
testimony concerning what was said inside the jury room is admissible as evidence 
in a motion for a new trial. ld. at 62, 30 N.E. at 166. The Court in this case 
said, "It is not denied that the testimony of a juror to what he said in the 
deliberations of the jury-room is inadmissible as evidence in a motion for a new 
trial, or that one juror cannot be permitted to testify to what was said by another 
juror during such deliberations." ld. 
26 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 246, 385 N.E.2d at 517. 
27 ld. at 250, 385 N.E.2d at 518. In reaching this decision the Court declined 
to follow Commonwealth v. Meserve, 156 Mass. 61, 30 N.E. 166 (1892). 1979 
Mass. Adv. Sh. at 251 n.7, 385 N.E.2d at 519 n.7. 
28 ld. at 249-50, 385 N.E.2d at 518. 
29 ld. at 246, 385 N.E.2d at 517. 
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that misconduct does not serve the interests of providing a fair and just 
trial for the litigants." 30 This decision does not alter the rule which 
excludes juror testimony concerning the subjective issues of whether, or 
how, the introduction of extraneous matter affected the jury's decision.31 
Testimony concerning the reasons for decisions, discussions of matters 
the judge instructed the jury to disregard, and discussions concerning 
a judge's instructions would continue to be excluded.32 While the Court 
recognized that it could not easily draw the line between objective 
factors and the juror's subjective mental processes, it concluded that it 
should not refuse to try.33 
In deciding to make certain testimony of jury room statements ad-
missible, the Court realized that proper procedural guidelines were 
needed to permit counsel and litigants to obtain such evidence, while 
at the same time protecting the jury system. Consequently, the Court 
outlined the appropriate procedures to be followed in gathering evi-
dence of jury misconduct for presentation at a hearing. In the interest 
of preventing harassment of jurors, the Court stated that attorneys and 
litigants may not independently contact jurors after a verdict is ren-
dered.34 The Court cautioned that any attorney or litigant who does 
so "acts at his peril, lest he be held as acting in the obstruction of the 
administration of justice." 35 If an attorney or litigant does receive 
unsolicited information of jury misconduct, the attorney may investigate 
it only to the extent necessary to determine if it is a matter worth bring-
ing to the judge'S attention.36 The attorney should then convey the 
information to the judge,37 and if the court finds some suggestion that 
extraneous matters were considered during the jury's deliberations, it 
may authorize the initiation of post-verdict interviews of jurors.38 
The Fidler Court believed that the jury system could best be protected 
by requiring that any post-verdict interviews of jurors by counselor 
litigants take place under the court's supervision.39 The Court, however, 
gave no specific recommendations concerning the type of supervision 
30 Id. See Note., Impeachment of Jury Verdicts, 53 MARQ. L. REv. 258 (1970). 
31 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 247, 385 N.E.2d at 517. 
32 Id. at 247-48, 385 N.E.2d at 517. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 255, 385 N.E.2d at 520. 
35 Id. (quoting Rakes v. United States, 169 F.2d 739, 745-46 (4th Cir.), cen. 
denied, 335 U.S. 826 (1948)). 
36 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 254, 385 N.E.2d at 520. 
37 Id. Infonnation should be brought by affidavit, if possible, as was done in 
this case. Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 252, 385 N.E.2d at 519. See also Note, Impeachment of Jury Verdicts: 
A Proposal, 1969 U. ILL. L.F. 388, 394. 
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required. It allowed the trial judge broad discretion in his decision to 
grant or deny requests for interviews, to question jurors himself, or to 
allow the parties to conduct interrogations.4o 
Once testimony alleging juror misconduct has been procured through 
a court-supervised interview, it may be presented at a hearing on a 
motion for a new trial. At such a hearing, the defendant bears the 
burden of demonstrating that the jury in fact was exposed to extraneous 
matter.41 If the judge finds that the extraneous matter was introduced, 
the burden shifts to the commonwealth to show, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that the defendant was not prejudiced by the extraneous matter.42 
In determining whether the extraneous matter was prejudicial, a judge 
may not receive any evidence concerning the actual effect of the matter 
on the jury's decision, since this procedure would involve probing the 
jurors' thought process. Instead, the judge must focus on the probable 
effect of the extraneous facts on an average, hypothetical jury.43 
The Fidler Court's decision is a logical application of the Massachu-
setts rule concerning the admiSSibility of juror testimony. In rejecting 
the strict rule of prohibition and formulating the rule to be followed in 
the commonwealth, the Woodward Court expressed a desire to allow the 
best evidence of jury irregularity to come to light without destroying 
the public policies that engendered the original strict rule of exclusion.44 
The Fidler Court expressed the same concerns as it brought the Massa-
chusetts rule closer to the more liberal rules applied in a number of 
other jurisdictions.45 In allowing jurors to testify to statements made 
in the jury room, the Court was sensitive to the possibility that jurors 
might be approached and even harassed by the losing party in order 
to establish grounds for a new trial. Thus, it prohibited counsel from 
approaching jurors and required that all post-verdict interviews be 
conducted under the court's supervision. In so dOing, the Court has 
added the measures necessary for the protection of the jurors and the 
jury system. 
40 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 253, 254, 385 N.E.2d at 520. 
41 [d. at 251, 385 N.E.2d at 519. 
42 [d. 
43 [d. 
44 See id. at 244-45, 385 N.E.2d at 516. 
45 See, e.g., Wright v. Illinois Cent. & Miss. Tel. Co., 20 Iowa 195 (1866), in 
which the "Iowa Rule." was e.stablished: "[A]ffidavits of jurors may be received for 
the purpose of avoiding a verdict, to show any matter occurring during the trial or in 
the jury room, which does not essentially inhere in the verdict itself . . .." [d. 
at 210. A number of jurisdictions have adopted the Iowa Rule or variations of it. 
See WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2354, at 702 n.l; Carlson & Sumberg, Attacking Jury 
Verdicts: Paradigms for Rule Revision, 1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 247, 257 & n.19 (1977). 
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§4.5. Hearsay-Business Records Exception. ~ In Commonwealth 
v. Walker, 1 the defendant was indicted on multiple charges including 
assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon (an automobile).2 
The charges stemmed from an occurrence following a racial confronta-
tion in Dorchester on the night of July 4, 1976.3 It was alleged that 
the defendant, driving ata high rate of speed, had turned his automobile 
towards three persons and had collided with them.4 The three persons 
were seriously injured.5 The defendant allegedly left the scene of the 
incident on foot.6 
At trial, over defendanfs objection, the court admitted into evidence, 
as a regular business entry pursuant to chapter 233, section 78,7 a police 
record of a stolen car report.8 The stolen car identified in the report 
was the same automobile involved in the Dorchester incident.9 The 
report contained a name, telephone number, and address for the owner, 
and was dated and stamped 9:31 p.m., July 4, 1976.10 It listed a "Mr. 
McGuigan" as the owner of the car.1l Mrs. McGuigan testified at trial, 
however, that she was the owner of the car and that while the telephone 
number listed in the report was hers, the address given was not.12 
§4.5. " By Nelson C. Apjohn, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
LAW. 
1 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2573, 397 N.E.2d 1105 (1979). 
2 ld. at 2573, 397 N.E.2d at 1106. The defendant was also indicted on three 
charge$ of operating a motor vehicle and leaVing after causing injury to a person 
and on one charge of operating an automobile to endanger the lives and safety of 
the public. ld. 
a ld. at 2574, 397 N.E.2d at 1l06. 
4 ld. 
5 ld. 
6 ld. 
7 ld. C.L. c. 233, § 78, provides in relevant part: 
An entry in an account kept in a book or by a card system or by any other 
system of keeping accounts, or a writing or record, whether in the form of an 
entry in a book or otherwise, made as a memorandum or record of any act, 
transaction, occurrence or event, shall not be inadmissible in any civil or crimi-
nal proceeding as evidence of the facts therein stated because it is transcribed 
or because it is hearsay or self-serving, if the court finds that the entry, writing 
or record was made in good faith in the re.gular course of business and before 
the beginning of the civil or criminal proceeding aforesaid and that it was the 
regular course of such business to make such memorandum or record at the 
time of such act, transaction, occurrence. or event or within a reasonable time 
thereafter. For the purposes hereof, the word "business," in addition to its 
ordinary meaning, shall include profession, occupation and calling of every 
kind .... 
8 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2577, 397 N.E.2d at llOB. 
9 ld. 
10 ld. There was evidence introduced at trial that the incident occurred in Dor-
chester before 9:31 p.m. ld. 
11 ld. 
12 ld. 
26
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1979 [1979], Art. 7
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1979/iss1/7
§4.5 EVIDENCE 107 
Furthennore, Mrs. McGuigan stated that the defendant was renting the 
car from her and that he had possession of the car during July 1976,I3 
Finally, she testified that she did not call the police and report that 
her car was stolen.14 On the basis of this evidence, the prosecutor 
requested the jury to infer that the defendant had called the police and 
reported the car stolen in an effort to cover up his involvement in the 
crimes charged.15 The defendant was subsequently convicted by the 
jury on those charges and appealed to the Appeals Court.16 The Su-
preme Judicial Court, on its own motion, transferred the case to its 
docket.17 
On appeal, the defendant assigned as error, inter alia, the admission 
into evidence of the police report.18 The defendant argued that the 
statements made by the unidentified caller to the police cadet who com-
pleted the report were inadmissible "second level" or "totem-pole" 
hearsay. 19 He supported his contention that a police report containing 
"second level" hearsay is inadmissible by citing the case of Kelly v. 
O'Neil.20 In Kelly, the Appeals Court held that a police report sum-
marizing interviews of witnesses to an automobile accident was not 
admissible under the business record exception to the hearsay rule.21 The 
court noted that there were two levels of hearsay contained in the re-
port.22 The first level consisted of the out-of-court statements of the 
police officer as to what he observed with his own senses during the 
investigation of the accident.23 The second level of hearsay consisted of: 
the statements made to the officer by other persons during the 
course of his investigation and as to which he would not be com-
petent to testify at trial unless the statements so made to him should 
not be offered for the truth of the matters contained therein (in 
which case the hearsay rule would not apply) or unless they could 
be fitted into some other exception to the hearsay rule . . . .24 
The court accepted the position of "[t]he better reasoned cases from 
other jurisdictions" 25 that the second level of hearsay found in police 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 2573-74, 397 N.E.2d at 1106. 
17 Id. at 2574, 397 N.E.2d at 1106. 
18 Id. at 2574, 2577-78, 397 N.E.2d at 1106, 1108. 
19 Id. at 2577, 397 N.E.2d at 1108. 
20 1 Mass. App. 313, 296 N.E.2d 223 (1973). 
21 Id. at 317, 296 N.E.2d at 226. 
22 Id. at 316, 296 N.E.2d at 225. 
23 Id.. 
24 Id. (emphasis supplied). 
25 Id. 
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reports (not falling independently within an exception to the hearsay 
rule) is not admissible hearsay under the business records exception. 26 
The Supreme Judicial Court in Walker found no difficulty in rejecting 
the defendant's assignment of error without disturbing the Kelly decision. 
With respect to the first level of hearsay, the Court noted that the police 
cadet who wrote the report had personal knowledge that the statements 
contained therei~ were made by a caller.27 This level of hearsay in the 
report presumably falls within the scope of chapter 233, section 78. 
The statements made to the cadet by the unidentified caller, the alleged 
"second level" of hearsay, were not offered for the truth of the matters 
asserted and, therefore, were not hearsay.28 Furthermore, the Court 
found that a proper foundation was laid under chapter 233, section 78, 
for admission of the record and that there was no abuse of discretion 
by the trial judge in admitting the record.29 The Court, therefore, held 
that the police record of the stolen car report was properly admitted at 
defendant's trial,3Q 
Commonwealth v. Garabedian,3! decided by the Appeals Court, was 
the second business records case decided during the Survey year. The 
defendant in Garabedian, a lawyer, was indicted for failing to file his 
Massachusetts income tax returns for the years 1973 through 1976.32 The 
defendant's secretary testified at trial that she remembered mailing both 
the 1974 and the 1975 return to the Boston office of the Department 
of Revenue.33 The keeper of records of the Department of Revenue 
testified that he had searched the Department's computer records of tax 
returns and had failed to discover any record of defendant's tax returns 
for 1974 and 1975.34 The defendant was acquitted of the charges relat. 
ing to 1973 and 1976, hut was convicted of the charges relating to 1974 
and 1975.35 
On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court's admission into 
evidence of the testimony of the keeper of records of the Department 
26 Id. at 316-17, 296 N.E.2d at 225-26. See generally C. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE 
§ 310 (2d ed. 1972). 
27 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2577, 397 N.E.2d at 1108. 
28 Id. at 2578, 397 N.E.2d at 1108. The report was not offered to establish 
that the car was stolen or that "Mr. McGuigan" owned the car. The report was 
offered instead to support the prosecutor's claim that the defendant had made the 
call in an attempted cover-up. 
29Id. 
30Id. 
3! 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1972,395 N.E.2d 467 (1979). 
32 Id. at 1972, 395 N.E.2d at 468. 
33 Id. at 1973, 395 N.E.2d at 468. 
34 Id. at 1974, 395 N.E.2d at 468. 
35 Id. at 1973, 395 N.E.2d at 468. 
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of Revenue was reversible error.36 The defendant contended that' evi-
dence establishing that the Department of Revenue had no record of 
his 1974 and 1975 returns was not admissible to prove that he had not 
filed those returns.37 The Appeals Court, however, ruled against the 
defendant and held that the admission of the testimony of the keeper 
of records was not error.3S 
In reaching its decision, the court first noted that the testimony of 
the keeper of records was based on a business record.39 The court then 
referred to official records and observed that "[e]vidence that no file or 
entry is found to exist in official records is admissible to show that the 
records contain no such file or entry." 40 In sustaining this position, the 
court cited chapter 223A, section 14, which allows the admission of 
evidence of failure to find an entry to prove the absence of such entry 
in an official record.41 
The court found additional support for its holding in Commonwealth 
v. Torrealba,42 in which the defendant was convicted of shoplifting.43 
The managers of the stores involved were allowed to testify that the 
cash register record was examined on the day in question and that no 
record of sale was found for any of the articles alleged to have been 
stolen.44 The Supreme Judicial Court held that this testimony was ad-
missible to show the absence of any record of sale.45 
Finally, in further support of its decision, the court cited United States 
v. Farris,46 another tax evasion case. In Farris, a statement by the Di-
36 ld. at 1975, 395 N.E.2d at 469. 
37 ld. 
3S ld. 
39 ld. It should be noted that G.L. c. 233, § 78, quoted in note 7 supra, applies 
only to the admission of affirmative entries and not to the absence of entries. G.L. 
c. 223A, § 14, MASS. R. CIV. P. 44(b), and MASS. R. CRIM. P. 40(b) all deal spe-
cifically with proving the absence of an entry in a record. See notes 41, 51, & 56 
infra. 
40 ld. 
41 ld. G.L. c. 223A, § 14 states: 
A written statement that after diligent search no record of entry of a specified 
tenor is found to exist in the records designated by the statement, authenticated 
as provided in [c. 223A, § 12] in the case of a domestic record, or complying 
with the requirements of [c. 223A, § 13] for a summary in the case of a record 
in a foreign country, shall be admissible as evidence that the records contain 
no such record or entry. 
In regard to criminal actions, see MASS. R. CRIM. P. 40( b). 
42 316 Mass. 24, 54 N.E.2d 939 (1944), cited at 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 
1975, 395 N.E.2d at 469. 
43 316 Mass. at 25, 26, 54 N.E.2d at 940, 941. 
44 ld. at 30, 54 N.E.2d at 942-43. 
45 ld. at 30, 54 N.E.2d at 943. 
46 517 F.2d 226 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 892 (1975), cited at 1979 
Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1976, 395 N.E.2d at 469. 
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rector of the National Computing Center of the Treasury Department 
was offered into evidence at tria1.4i The statement was to the effect 
that the center's computer records had been searched and that no record 
of defendant's tax return had been found. 4R The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the evidence was admissible.4n 
The Farris holding rested, in part, on Rule 27 of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, which incorporates by reference the provisions of 
Rule 44 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (which provides the 
method of proving official records and entry or lack of entry therein) .50 
47 517 F.2d at 227. 
48 ld. at 227-28. An attachment to the statement consisting of computer print-
outs indicated that no returns were filed for the years in question. ld. 
4!l ld. at 228-29. The actual holding of Farris is that officially certified computer 
data compilations are self-authenticating. ld. at 227 & n.l, 228-29. 
:;0 ld. at 227-28. FED. R. CRIM. P. 27 provides: "An official record or an entry 
therein or the. lack of such a record or entry may be proved in the same manner 
as in civil actions." This procedure is accomplished in civil actions under FED. R. 
CrY. P. 44 which states: 
(a) Authentication. 
( 1) Domestic. An official record kept within the United States, or any state, 
district, commonwealth, territory, or insular possession thereof, or within the 
Panama Canal Zone, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, or the Ryukyu 
Islands, or an entry therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be evi-
denced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer 
having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied 
by a certificate that such officer has the custody. The certificate may be 
made by a judge of a court of record of the district or political subdivision 
in which the record is kept, authenticated by the seal of the court, or may 
be made by any public officer having a seal of office and having official duties 
in the district or political subdivision in which the record is kept, authenti-
cated by the seal of his office. 
(2) Foreign. A foreign official record, or an entry therein, when admissible 
for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof; or a copy 
thereof, attested by a person authorized to make the attestation, and accom-
panied by a final certification as to the genuineness of the signature and 
official pOSition (i) of the attesting person, or (ii) of any foreign official 
whose certificate of genuineness of Signature and official position relates to 
the attestation or is in a chain of certificates of genuineness of signature and 
official position relating to the attestation. A final certification may be made 
by a secretary or embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or 
consular agent of the United States, or a diplomatic or consular official of the 
foreign country assigned or accredited to the United States. If reasonable 
opportunity has been given to all parties to investigate the authenticity and 
accuracy of the documents, the court may, for good cause shown, (i) admit 
an attested copy without final certification or (ii) permit the foreign official 
record to be evidenced by an attested summary with or without a final cer-
tification. 
(b) Lack of Record. A written statement that after diligent search no record 
or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, desig-
nated by the statement, authenticated as provided in subdivision (a) ( 1) of this 
rule in the case of a domestic record, or complying with the :requirements of 
subdivision (a) (2) of this rule for a summary in the case of a foreign record, 
is admissible as evidence that the records contain no such record or entry. 
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The Appeals Court of Massachusetts in Garabedian noted that Rule 
44( b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is identical to Rule 40( b ) 
of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure (which provides the 
method of proving the absence of a record or entry in official records 
in criminal actions) .51 Although Rule 40( b) was not in effect at the 
time of defendant's trial, the court found that the rule gave formal 
recognition to previous Massachusetts practice.52 The court, therefore, 
concluded that Rule 40( b) of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, combined with the Farris case, also supported its holding 
with respect to the admissibility of the testimony of the keeper of 
records of the Department of Revenue. 
Upon examination, the Appeals Court's rationale is tenuous. The 
court's initial reliance on section 78 of chapter 233 of the General Laws 
is questionable because it failed to note that this statute applies by its 
terms only to the admission of affirmative entries.53 Moreover, the court 
confused two separate questions: first, whether the absence of an entry 
in a business record may be offered to prove the nonoccurrence or non-
existence of a matter; and second, what evidence is admissible to prove 
that the records in question do not contain an entry or file. The de-
fendant's contention in Garabedian was that evidence establishing that 
the Department of Revenue did not have records of his returns for 1974 
and 1975 was not admissible to prove he did not file a return in those 
years. 54 The court did not address contrary Massachusetts decisions 
which have held that a party's business entries or books of account may 
not be admitted on his behalf to prove the nonoccurrence or nonexis-
tence of a matter by showing the absence of affirmative entries. 55 The 
court's rationale, for the most part, simply supports the proposition that 
the absence of an entry or file in official records may be proved by a 
( c) Other Proof. This rule does not pre,vent the proof of official records or 
of entry or lack of entry therein by any other method authorized by law. 
51 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1976, 395 N.E.2d at 469. Rule 40(b) 
provides in relevant part: "A written statement that after diligent search no record 
or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records designated by the 
statement . . . is admissible as evidence that the records contain nO' suoh record 
or entry." See FED. R. ClV. P. 44(b), quoted in note 50 supra. Rule 40(b) is also 
substantially identical to G.L. c. 223A, § 14. See text and note at note 41 supra. 
52 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1976, 395 N.E.2d at 469. 
53 See note 39 supra. 
54 ld. at 1975, 395 N.E.2d at 469. 
55 Mackintosh v. Cioppa, 245 Mass. 152, 155, 139 N.E. 445,446 (1923); Riley 
v. Boehm, 167 Mass. 183, 187, 45 N.E. 84 (1896); Sanborn v. Fireman's Ins. Co., 
82 Mass. (16 Gray) 448, 455 (1860); Morse. v. Potter, 70 Mass. (4 Gray) 292, 293 
(1855); K. HUGHES, 19 MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE, EVIDENCE § 594 n.20 (19£1). 
This rule has been followed only where a party seeks to introduce his own business 
records. See Cohen v. Boston Edison Co., 322 Mass. 239, 76 N.E.2d 766 (1948). 
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written statement that such entry or file was not found after diligent 
search.56 
Nevertheless, the court's holding, while not supported by existing 
Massachusetts law,57 does not lack general authority in its support. It 
appears that a majority of courts admit evidence of the absence of an 
entry in a business record relating to a transaction to prove the non-
occurrence of that transaction.~8 The Federal Rules of Evidence and 
the Uniform Rules of Evidence explicitly provide for such a rule with 
qualifications. 59 In addition, a prominent authority on evidence argues 
in support of such a rule and finds the contrary attitude by some courts 
distressing.60 The court's holding in Garabedian, therefore, should re-
sult in an eventual reexamination of prior Massachusetts precedent on 
this issue. Such re-examination may lead to a rule which reHects more 
closely the position of modern authority on this question. 
§4.6. Hearsay-Hospital Records Exception. 0 Massachusetts Gen-
eral Laws chapter 233, section 79, provides an exception to the hearsay 
rule whereby hospital records may be introduced at trial to prove the 
truth of the information recorded. The statute covers all records kept 
by hospitals, dispensaries or clinics, and sanatoria that are licensed by 
the Department of Public Health or supported in whole or in part by 
the commonwealth, as well as records of similar facilities located in 
other states.1 An important qualification to the admissibility of these 
records is made in the statute: the information sought to be introduced 
must pertain to the treatment and history of patients.2 No portion of a 
hospital record referring to the issue of liability may be admitted under 
section 79.3 
56 See C.L. c. 223A, § 14, quoted in note 41 supra, for statutory reCOgnition of 
this proposition. See also MASS. R. CIV. P. 44(b). See MASS. R. CRIM. P. 40(b), 
quoted in note 51 supra, for recognition of this proposition in criminal practice. 
"This subdivision [subdivision (b) of Rule 40] permits the written statement of a 
custodial officer that no particular record can be found . . . to suffice as proof that 
no such record exists." Reporters' Notes to Rule 40, MASS. ANN. LAWS, Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, 582 (Law. Co-op. 1979) (emphasis supplied). 
57 See cases cited in note 55 supra. 
58 C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 307 (2d ed. 1972). 
59 FED. R. EVID. 803(7); Uniform Rule 803(7). Both rules state that such 
evidence is inadmissible where "the sources of information or other circumstances 
indicate lack of trustworthiness." 
60 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1531 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974). 
§4.6 ... By Barbara Jane Levine, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
LAw. 
1 C.L. c. 233, § 79 (1979). The admissibility of records from facilities in other 
states is subject to the court's discretion. Id. 
2 Id. 
aId. 
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During the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court, in Bouchie v. 
Murray,4 attempted to guide trial judges in determining whether, or 
what portion of, a particular hospital record is admissible under the 
statute. Plaintiff Robert Bouchie was involved in an automobile acci-
dent in which he sustained head injuries.5 In an action against the 
other driver for negligence, Bouchie introduced testimony from a doctor 
who had examined him after the accident for possible brain damage. 
As a part of his testimony, the doctor read portions of the hospital 
record of Bouchie's examinations that revealed information relating 
both to Bouchie's physical condition and his personal history.6 On 
cross-examination, over Bouchie's objection, the defense introduced the 
entire record, which included a consultation report by a psychiatrist. 
This report in turn included statements made to the psychiatrist by 
Bouchie's wife concerning her opinion as to why Bouchie had the ac-
cident.7 
Reviewing Bouchie's objection on direct appeal and ultimately revers-
ing the judgment to allow a new trial, the Supreme JudiCial Court set 
forth a four-part analysis to be employed in determining whether Mrs. 
Bouchie's statements were admissible. First, the Court wrote, "[T]he 
document must be the type of record contemplated by [the statute]:' S 
The statute was designed to relieve hospital staff of the cost and incon-
venience of leaving work to testify in court about the very facts which 
could be found in hospital records.9 At the same time, however, the 
statute was not designed to allow admission of all hospital records. To 
come within the hearsay exception the information in the records must 
be of the type which aids the hospital staff in the care and treatment 
of patients. Although the person who prepared the record cannot be 
cross-examined by the opposing counsel and the preparer's demeanor 
cannot be observed by the fact-finder, the information contained in the 
records as to a patient's treatment is presumed by the statute to be 
reliable and trustworthy 10 because false or inaccurate information could 
seriously interfere with the hospital staff's work. 
The second part of the Court's analYSis focused in greater depth on 
the subject matter of the records. The Court recognized that difficulty 
4 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2727, 381 N.E.2d 1295. 
5 Id at 2728, 381 N.E.2d at 1297. 
6 Id. at 2728.-29, 381 N.E.2d at 1297. 
7 Id. at 2729, 381 N.E.2d at 1297. The statements objected to were: "Wife 
says it occurred when [Bouchil enraged and out of control. ... [S]he felt he was 
going to have a nervous breakdown, but had the accident instead." Id. 
sId. at 2735-36, 381 N.E.2d 1300. 
9 Leonard v. Boston Elevated Ry., 234 Mass. 480, 482, 125 N.E. 593, 593 
(1920). 
10 See Globe Indem. Co. of N.Y. v. Reinhart, 152 Md. 439, 446-47, 137 A. 43, 
46 (1927). 
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may be encountered in determining whether information relates to treat-
ment and medical history or to liability. Indeed, a portion of a hospital 
record may be viewed as relating to both. For example, in two cases 
decided in 1920 11 and 1930,12 the notation "odor of alcohol on breath," 
while found to be a reference to the patient's physical condition, was 
also found to relate to the patient's liability for driving a car under the 
influence of alcohol,13 Nonetheless, in both cases it was determined that 
the possibility that liability could be inferred from the notation did not 
negate the notation's value for treatment purposes and hence did not 
require its exclusion.14 A distinction thus is made between facts which 
relate solely to liability and do not aid the hospital in rendering treat-
ment and those which relate to the incident which brought the patient 
to the hospital but which may be pertinent to the patient's treatment.15 
The former is excluded from evidence while the latter is admissible. If 
improper use is made of the admitted record during the trial, the judge 
should instruct the jury as to the record's proper limitations.16 The 
Court also indicated that the presumption of reliability upon which 
section 79 is based is inapplicable to recorded statements that are not 
the kind relied on by a hospital staff in the course of their work, thus 
rendering them outside the reach of section 79.17 Therefore, the Court 
ruled that the objection to the admission of the statements in the psy-
chiatrist's report as to Mrs. Bouchie's opinion concerning the cause of 
the accident was proper.18 
A third factor considered by the Court was the source of the recorded 
information. Information relating to medical treatment must be that 
obtained from the recorder's personal knowledge, from the patient's 
statements regarding medical history made to aid the doctor iI\ the treat-
ment, or from a compilation of the personal knowledge of someone 
obligated in the course of his employment to transmit medical informa-
tion to the recorder.19 If the information does not fall within any of 
11 Leonard v. Boston Elevated Ry., 234 Mass. 480, 125 N.E. 593 (1920). 
12 Clark v. Beacon Oil Co., 271 Mass. 27, 170 N.E. 836 (1930). 
13 Leonard v. Boston Elevated Ry., 234 Mass. at 483, 125 N.E. at 594 (unable 
to say as a matter of law that notation unrelated to medical history); Clark v. Beacon 
Oil Co., 271 Mass. at 28-29, 170 N.E. at 837. 
14 Leonard v. Boston Elevated Ry., 234 Mass. at 483, 125 N.E. at 593-94; Clark 
v. Beacon Oil Co., 271 Mass. at 28-9, 170 N.E. at 837. 
15 Clark v. Beacon Oil Co., 271 Mass. at 30,170 N.E. at 837. See 4 J. WEINSTEIN 
& M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE ~ 803(4) ,[01], at 130 (1979). 
HI 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2735, 381 N.E.2d at 1300. Cf. Glark v. Beacon Oil 
Co.,271 Mass. 27,170 N.E. 836 (1930) (instructions not always necessary). 
17 1978 Mass. Adv. 5h. at 2733, 381 N.E.2d at 1298. 
18 ld. at 2733-34, 381 N.E.2d at 1299. 
19 ld. at 2736, 381 N.E.2d at 1300. The emphasis is on "the regular course of 
someone's business"-in this case in the course of a patient's treatment. See Note, 
Revised Business Entry Statutes: TheoTY and Practice, 48 CO(.UM. L. REV. 920, 
34
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1979 [1979], Art. 7
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1979/iss1/7
§4.6 EVIDENCE 115 
these categories it does not come within the purview of section 79. In 
this regard, the Court determined that the statements in the testifying 
doctor's record concerning what he observed when examining Bouchie, 
as well as what the psychiatrist himself observed, were adrnissible.20 
The Court, however, was unsure whether Mrs. Bouchie's statement con-
cerning her husband's mental state before the accident was made to aid 
the psychiatrist in his diagnosis and treatment of Bouchie. The Court, 
therefore, directed the trial judge on retrial to make such a determina-
tion.21 If the judge determined that the statement was made to assist 
in diagnosis, it should be admissible even though made by a third person 
-as long as the third person had knowledge of the patient's medical 
history which was gained from an intimate relationship with the patient.22 
Thus, the Court ruled that it is within the trial judge's discretion to 
decide whether the relationship between the declarant, in this case the 
defendant's spouse, and the patient is close enough to warrant a presump-
tion of reliability.23 
The last part of the analysis concerns statements that are not related 
to treatment, history, or liability or statements that were made volun-
tarily or casually and are not to be relied upon by a doctor. Bypassiqg 
section 79, the inquiry looks to whether the statements to be introduced'· 
as evidence come within any other exception to the hearsay rule or 
whether they are being introduced for reasons other than to prove the 
truth of the statements contained therein.24 
924-25 (1948). Thus, when the information in the record was recorded from the 
personal knowledge of someone in no way obligated to supply the information, it is 
excluded not because it is hearsay but because it was not recorded pursuant to regu-
lar hospital routine. See Standard Oil Co. of CaL v. Moore, 251 F.2d 188, 213-14 
(9th Cir. 1957), cen. denied, 356 U.S. 975 (1958). 
20 See 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2735, 381 N.E.2d at 1298-99. 
21 rd. See 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 11 803(4) [01], 
at 127 (1979). 
22 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2735, 381 N.E.2d at 1299. 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BER-
GER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 11 803( 4) [01], at 127 (1979). 
23 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2734-35, 381 N.E.2d at 1299. The concurring judge 
was unwilling to compare the hospital records exception with the more general busi-
ness records exception. See C.L. c. 233, § 78. He appeared to read into the ma-
jority's opinion a requirement that the facts in hospital records which do pertain to 
treatment and medical history must also fit within some other exception to the hear-
say rule as well. rd. at 2737, 381 N.E.2d at 1300 (Braucher, J.). This is not 
really what the majority wrote. Rather, the majority pur.ported to explain briefly 
the applicability of the hospital records exception and in so doing was forced 
to view the requirements of section 79 as similar to the requirements of the business 
records exception, C.L. c. 233, § 78. See id. at 2731-33, 381 N.E.2d at 1298-99. 
Although section 79 was enacted in substantially different form from section 78, the 
two exceptions serve similar purposes and are based on similar concepts of inherent 
accuracy and reliability. See 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1420, 1422, 1423 (Chad-
bourn rev. ed. 1974). 
24 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2736, 381 N.E.2d at 1300. 
35
Apjohn et al.: Chapter 4: Evidence
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1979
116 1979 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §4.6 
Two Appeals Court cases involving the scope of section 79 decided 
after Bouchie illustrate that problems continue to arise concerning factual 
determinations, despite Bouchie's clear analysis. Commonwealth v. 
DiSanto 25 and Commonwealth v. Underwood 26 considered the difficul-
ties trial judges face in determining whether the information refers to 
treatment and history or to liability and whether the record arose from 
an obligation to record information concerning a patient. 
In DiSanto, the defendant objected to the admission of a portion of 
his hospital record that estimated the time of his injury. The defendant 
claimed the estimate related to liability.27 Although the evidence at 
trial revealed that one of the persons who participated in the armed 
robbery had been struck by the police detective's car and had limped 
toward the getaway car,28 the court determined that the notations in the 
defendant's hospital record made no reference to any cause of the injury 
or to any question of liability. Noting nothing to the contrary in Bouchie 
v. Murray, the court commented that if the estimation of time of injury 
related to liability, it did so only incidentally.29 In addition, the defend-
ant claimed that the estimates were made by the doctor pursuant to a 
police request, although he did not support this claim with any evi-
dence. 3o The court responded by stating that it was within the trial 
judge's discretion to determine the reliability of the information con-
tained in the record. 31 
In Underwood, the defendant attempted to introduce his hospital 
record into evidence to show that he was incapable of holding a gun 
in his hand as the police officer testified.32 The trial judge admitted most 
of the record, including notations that Underwood had "poor grasp" 38 
and "no active extension of wrist or fingers," 34 but he excluded the "Dis-
charge Summary" because it was made twenty-eight days after the date 
of the arrest.S5 The Appeals Court disagreed that the issue of the time 
gap was relevant under these circumstances.36 Citing Bouchie and mak-
ing an analogy to situations which are covered by the more general 
25 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 2291, 2300-01, 397 N.E.2d 672, 677-78. 
26 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 303, 386 N.E.2d 762. Although both cases 
were criminal prosecutions, section 79 does not violate the defendant's constitutional 
right to confrontation. See Commonwealth v. Franks, 359 Mass. 577, 270 N.E.2d 
837 (1971). 
27 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 2300, 397 N.E.2d at 677. 
28 Id. at 2299, 397 N.E.2d at 677. 
29 Id. at 2330, 397 N.E.2d at 678. 
30Id. 
31 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 304, 386 N.E.2d at 763. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
86 Id. at 305, 386 N.E.2d at 763. 
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hearsay exception for business records,37 the court stated that as long as 
the contents of the "Discharge Summary" were relevant to the material 
issue of the case, the fact that the information was simply a summary 
of information obtained from other records does not render them inad-
missible as evidence.38 
These three cases present recent judicial interpretations of section 79. 
In particular, the Supreme Judicial Court's opinion in Bouchie v. Murray 
articulates guidelines which should be used by trial courts in their deter-
mination of what information can be admitted under chapter 23, section 
79. The Appeals Court decisions, on the other hand, illustrate that the 
practical application of these guidelines is not always easy. 
§4.7. Doctrine of'Verbal Completeness and Use of Tape Reoord-
ings.... The doctrine of "verbal completeness" stated simply, requires 
that a verbal utterance be taken as a whole.1 Specifically, it requires 
that when a portion of a conversation or statement is offered into evi-
dence, the trier of fact must be allowed to consider that portion within 
the context of the whole conversation or statement.2 This requirement 
is necessary if the actual meaning of the utterance is not to be distorted. 
As was recognized in an early Massachusetts decision, "[t]he force and 
effect of particular expressions may be, and often are, greatly modified 
or affected by the connection in which they are uttered." 3 Nevertheless, 
a trial court should not be required by the doctrine of verbal complete-
ness to admit evidence which is otherwise irrelevant and inadmissible.4 
In Commonwealth v. Watson,t' the Supreme Judicial Court resolved the 
competing concerns of completeness and relevance by defining, in light 
of its prior decisions, a limited rule of verbal completeness. 
The defendant in Watson was charged with murder in the first degree.6 
The murder occurred at approximately 3:00 p.m. on November 20, 1975.7 
The defendant was arrested on December 2, 1975, and after being given 
the required Miranda 8 warnings, was questioned by a police sergeant.9 
37 Id. at 305, 386 N.E.2d at 763-64. Cf. note 23 supra. 
38 Id., 386 N.E.2d at 764. 
§4.7 ... By Nelson G. Apjohn, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSE'ITS 
LAW. 
1 See 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 604 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1978) [hereinafter 
cited as WIGMORE]. 
2 See C. MCCORMICK, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 130-31 (2<l ed. 1972) [hereinafter 
cited as MCCORMICK]. 
3 Commonwealth v. Goddard, 80 Mass. (14 Gray) 402, 404 (1860). 
4 MCCORMICK, supra note 2, at 130. 
5 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1037,388 N.E.2d 680 (1979). 
6 Id. at 1037, 388 N.E.2<l at 682. 
7 Id. at 1049, 388 N.E.2<l at 686. 
8 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
9 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1049, 388 N.E.2<l at 686. 
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The interrogation, lasting only ten minutes, was tape recorded in its 
entirety and was later transcribed.10 
At trial, during a voir dire examination, the prosecutor stated that she 
intended to introduce testimony by the police sergeant who had ques-
tioned the defendant concerning a portion of the defendant's interroga-
tion,u The section of the interrogation included a question by the 
sergeant about the defendant's whereabouts at the time of the murder 12 
and the defendant's response that he was cashing his paycheck and pay-
ing a bill.13 The prosecutor stated that she had another witness who 
was prepared to testify that the defendant had actually cashed the check 
in question much earlier in the day.14 Over the defendant's objection, 
the judge permitted the sergeant to read to the jury that portion of the 
transcript dealing with the whereabouts of the defendant at the time 
of the homicide.15 The judge then denied the defendant's request to 
<:ldmit into evidence the tape of the entire interrogation and to allow the 
tape to be played to the jury.16 The defendant was subsequently con-
victed of first degree murder.17 
On appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court,18 the defendant assigned as 
error, inter alia, the trial court's refusal to admit into evidence the entire 
transcript of his interrogation by the police.19 The defendant contended 
that the doctrine of verbal completeness compelled the admission of the 
10 ld. 
11 ld. The portion of the interrogation the prosecutor sought to offer consisted 
of the following: 
Q. [Sergeant]: "Now, 1 want to talk to you about back to Thursday, November 
20, 1975, about two-thirty or three o'clock in the afternoon." A. [Watson]: 
"Yes." Q.: "Where were you at that time, Joe?" A.: "At that time 1 cashed 
my check at the First National Bank at Huntington Avenue. 1 went over to 
Shawmut Avenue to pay a bill there." Q.: "I understand. Then where did you 
go?" A.: "I went to [my girl friend's] house . ." Q.: " ... Where does she live?" 
The same place 1 was around today?" A.: "Right, and 1 was drinking with 
her. 1 came back to my house about eight o'clock." 
ld. at 1049 n.10, 388 N.E.2d at 686 n.10. 
12 ld. at 1050, 388 N.E.2d at 686. 
131d. 
14 ld. Subsequently, it was stipulated that the check was cashed at 9:12 a.m. on 
November 20, 1975. ld. at 1050, 388 N.E.2d at 686-87. 
15 ld. at 1050, 388 N.E.2d at 687. 
161d. 
17 ld. at 1037, 388 N.E.2d at 682. 
18 Subsequent to the appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court, the defendant filed a 
motion for a new trial pursuant to C.L. c. 278, § 29 (repealed by Acts of 1979, c. 
344, § 46). This motion was remitted to the superior court for. hearing and deter-
mination pursuant to C.L. c. 278, § 33E. The superior court, after an evidentiary 
hearing, denied the motion. The defendant's appeal from this determination by the 
superior court was consolidated by the Supreme Judicial Court with his then pend-
ing appeal from conviction. ld. at 1037-38, 388 N.E.2d at 682. 
19 ld. at 1038, 388 N.E.2d at 682. 
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transcript.20 The Court in Watson, however, rejected the defendant's 
contention and held that the doctrine of verbal completeness requires 
that when a portion of a party's statement is put into evidence by his 
adversary, the former party may introduce into evidence only those 
additional portions of the statement said at the same time and upon the 
same subject.21 
In rejecting the defendant's contention, the Watson Court observed 
that the defendant relied, to a large extent, upon the broad statement 
of the doctrine as contained in the case of Commonwealth v. Goddard.22 
The Goddard Court had stated that: 
if one party puts in evidence a part of the admissions or conversa-
tions of the other [party], the latter is entitled to produce, or draw 
out by cross-examination, testimony concerning all that was said 
upon the occasion referred to .... [A]II that was said at any inter-
view bearing upon the subject of inquiry, of which only detached 
parts have been given in evidence, may be proved in behalf of those 
against whom the part only has been produced.23 
The Watson Court recognized that defendant's reliance on this broad 
statement was not without support. 24 The Court noted, however, that 
the doctrine of verbal completeness as stated in other decisions was of a 
narrower dimension.25 
Citing Commonwealth v. Keyes 26 as an example of one of these de-
cisions, the Court quoted from Keyes as follows: "It is undoubtedly 
the general rule that whenever the statements, declarations or admissions 
of a party are made subjects of proof, all that was said by him at the 
same time and upon the same subject is admissible in his favor, and the 
whole should be taken and considered together." 27 The Court observed 
20 rd. at 1050-51, 388 N.E.2d at 687. 
21 rd. at 1052-54, 1058-59, 388 N .E.2d at 687-88, 690. 
22 80 Mass. (14 Gray) 402 (1860). It should be noted that the Court in God-
dard did not refer to the "doctrine of verbal completeness." Nevertheless, the 
principle laid out in the Goddard case is commonly referred to as the doctrine of 
verbal completeness or the rule of verbal completeness. 
23 rd. at 404. 
24 In Farley v. Rodocanachi, 100 Mass. 427 (1868), the Court stated the rule as 
follows: "[W]hen a part of a conversation or admission is introduced, the other side 
may prove all that was said." rd. at 429, quoted in Watson, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
at 1051-52, 388 N.E.2d at 687. 
25 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Schnackenberg, 356 Mass. 65, 70-71, 248 N.E.2d 
273, 277 (1969); Commonwealth v. Trefethen, 157 Mass. 180, 197, 31 N.E. 961, 
967-68 (1892); Commonwealth v. Campbell, 155 Mass. 537, 538-39, 30 N.E. 72, 74 
( 1892); Commonwealth v. Keyes, 77 Mass. (11 Gray) 323, 324 (1858). 
26 77 Mass. (11 Gray) 323 (1858). 
27 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1052, 388 N.E.2d at 687 (quoting Keyes, 77 Mass. (11 
Gray) at 324) (emphasis supplied by the Watson Court). 
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that it had restated the Keyes rule limiting admission to statements made 
at the same time and upon the same subject in the more recent decision 
of Commonwealth v. Schnackenberg.28 Thus, on the basis of its prior 
decisions, the Court reaffirmed the limited rule of verbal completeness 
and applied it to the facts in Watson. 29 
In applying the limited rule of verbal completeness, the Court rejected 
the defendant's contention that evidence of his entire interrogation should 
have been admitted. 30 The Court noted that the section of the interroga-
tion presented by the prosecution at trial concerned only questions and 
answers relating to the defendant's whereabouts at the time of the 
homicide and that everything in the transcript relating to the defendant's 
whereabouts had been admitted into evidence by the trial judge.31 Al-
though the excluded portions of the interrogation 32 may have been rele-
vant to other issues presented at trial, the Court ruled that the doctrine 
of verbal completeness did not compel admission of those segments of 
the interrogation not related to the defendant's whereabouts.33 Hence, 
28 356 Mass. 65, 70-71, 248 N.E.2d 273,277 (1969). 
29 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1052-53, 1058, 388 N.E.2d at 687-88, 690. The Court 
also conducted an extensive examination of secondary authority on the doctrine of 
verbal completeness. rd. at 1054-58, 388 N.E.2d at 688-90. The Court found that 
this authority also supported the limited scope of the doctrine as enunciated in Keyes. 
See, e.g., W.B. LEACH & P.}. LIAcos, MASSACHUSETTS EVIDENCE 320 (4th ed. 1967); 
MCCORMICK, supra note 2, at 130; WIGMORE, supra note 1, at 653-60. For example, 
the Court observed that a limitation of the doctrine of verbal completeness asserted 
by Wigmore was that "[n]o more of the remainder of the utterance than concerns 
the same subiect, and is explonatory of the first part, is receivable." 1979 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. at 1056, 388 N.E.2d at 689 (quoting WIGMORE, supra note 1, at 657) (emphasis 
contained in the original text). Moreover, the Court noted that other jurisdictions 
also applied a limited rule of verbal completeness. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1057, 
388 N.E.2d at 689. In particular, the Court directed its attention to the second 
circuit where the United States Court of Appeals had stated it was "well settled 
that only those parts of a document which throw light upon the parts already ad-
mitted become competent uron its introduction." United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 
201,230 (2d Cir. 1950), affd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), quoted at 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
at 1057, 388 N.E.2d at 689. See also Camps v. New York City Transit Auth., 261 
F.2d 320, 322 (2d Cir. 1958); United States v. Corrigan, 168 F.2d 641, 645 (2d 
Cir. 1948). 
30 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1060-62, 388 N.E.2d at 691. 
31 rd. at 1059-60, 388 N.E.2d at 690. 
32 The Court summarized the excluded portions of the interrogation as follows: 
(a) he learned from a friend that the police were looking for him in con-
nection with the shooting of [the victim], (b) he did not know [the victim], and 
because he did not know him he never saw or talked to him, (c) he formerly 
lived with Charlotte Crawford, she told him she was going to testify against 
him, he never told her that he had shot [the victim], he is the father of two 
of her children, she now hates him because he complained to the welfare de-
partment about her, and that she put her daughter Laverne up to testifying 
against him, and (d) he did not own a gun, he never told Laverne that he 
owned a gun and never showed her a gun, and he never told her that he was 
going to shoot [the victim]. 
rd. at 1060, 388 N.E.2d at 690-91. 
33 rd. at 1060-61, 388 N.E.2d at 691. 
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under the Watson Court's interpretation of the doctrine of verbal com-
pleteness, the defendant could offer only those statements made at the 
time of his interrogation and upon the subject of his whereabouts at the 
time of the homicide. 
The defendant's appeal in Watson did not depend solely on the doc-
trine of verbal completeness, but also rested on the separate ground 
that the trial court erred in refusing to admit the tape recording of his 
interrogation.34 The defendant contended that the recording was neces-
sary to demonstrate to the jury that he spoke with a heavy Spanish 
accent, that he was intoxicated at the time of the interrogation, and that 
he could not comprehend the questions he was asked at the interroga-
tion.35 This evidence was relevant in part because there were witnesses 
present at the homicide who testified that they had not noticed an 
accent in the assailant's speech.3G The defendant denied that the record-
ing would have been offered to prove the truth of what he had said.37 
The Court rejected the defendant's argument that the tape recording 
should have been admitted. It observed that there was no set rule of 
law of the commonwealth either requiring or prohibiting the admission 
of a tape recording into evidence.38 Nevertheless, the Court found that 
authority from other jurisdictions appeared to support the rule that the 
decision to admit a relevant tape recording rested within the sound 
discretion of the trial court.39 The Court noted that to allow the tape 
recording to be admitted into evidence would permit the defendant 
to bring in the same information which the Court held was properly 
excluded by the trial judge in applying the doctrine of verbal complete-
ness.40 Moreover, the Court found that a limiting instruction could 
not eliminate the risk that the jury would consider the evidence for 
the truth of the statements which it contained.41 The Court held, 
therefore, that the trial judge's refusal to admit the tape recording was 
not an abuse of discretion in the circumstances presented.42 In reaching 
this holding, the Court implicitly accepted the position taken by other 
jurisdictions that it is within the sound discretion of the trial judge to 
determine the admissibility of a relevant tape recording. 
34 ld. at 1038, 388 N.E.2d at 682. 
MId. at 1062, 388 N.E.2d at 691. 
36 ld. at 1041, 388 N.E.2d at 683. 
37 ld. at 1065, 388 N.E.2d at 692. 
38 ld. at 1062, 388 N.E.2d at 691. 
39 ld. at 1062-63, 388 N.E.2d at 691. The Court cited United States v. Dimuro, 
540 F.2d 503, 512 (lst Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977); Gorin v. 
United States, 313 F.2d 641, 652 (1st Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 971 (1965). 
40 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1065, 388 N.E.2d at 692. 
41 ld. 
42 ld. 
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It should be noted that the Court did not demonstrate any general 
hostility towards the use of tape recordings as evidence. The Court 
acknowledged that a number of jurisdictions recognized the value of 
such evidence in resolving questions of fact.4~ Nevertheless, because the 
trial judge is in the best position to determine the impact of a tape re-
cording on the jury, his or her decision should not be set aside unless 
there is an abuse of discretion.H The determination of what circum-
stances will constitute an abuse of the trial court's discretion must be 
resolved on a case by case basis. 
§4.8. Corroborative Evidence of Immunized Witness. (J In 1970 the 
legislature adopted a measure authorizing immunity for witnesses under 
certain conditions.! As part of the act, the legislature enacted chapter 
233, section 201, which provides that no criminal defendant may be 
convicted solely on the testimony of an immunized witness.2 Since 
its adoption, the courts have narrowly construed section 201. In Com-
monwealth v. DeBrosky,3 the first case decided under the statute, the 
Court determined that section 201 does not 'require corroborating testi-
mony to identify the defendant as a participant in the crime.4 Instead, 
the Court held that section 201 merely requires some evidence in sup-
port of the immunized witness's testimony on at least one element of 
proof essential to convict the defendant. 5 The DeBrosky Court thus 
established the rule that evidence corroborating the immunized wit-
ness's testimony concerning commission of the crime would satisfy 
section 201 even if there were no other evidence linking the defendant 
to the crime.6 
A case decided during the Survey year continued the Court's restric-
tive interpretation of section 201. In Commonwealth v. Jacobs,7 the 
defendant was convicted of assault and battery and unlawful carrying 
43 See, e.g., Sanders v. State, 237 Miss. 772, 776, 115 So. 2d 145, 146 (1959); 
State v. Porter, 125 Mont. 503, 513, 242 P.2d 984, 989 (1952); People v. Harding, 44 
App. Div. 2d 800, 801, 355 N.Y.S.2d 394, 397 (1974); Williams v. State, 93 Okla. 
Crim. 260, 270-71, 226 P.2d 989, 995 (1951); State v. Reyes, 209 Or. 595, 636, 308 
P.2d 182, 196 (1957). 
44 Soo United States v. Bastone, 526 F.2d 971, 978 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 
425 U.S. 973 (1976). 
§4.8. " By Barry J. Palmer, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSE'ITS 
LAW. 
! Acts of 1970, C. 408, 
2 The full text of C.L. C. 233, § 201, is as follows: "No defendant in any criminal 
proceeding shall be convicted solely on the testimony of, or the evidence produced 
by, a person granted immunity under the provisions of Section twenty E." 
3 363 Mass. 718, 297 N.E.2d 496 (1973). 
4 Id. at 729-30, 297 N .E.2d at 504-05. 
5 Id. at 730, 297 N.E.2d at 505. 
6 Id. 
7 1978 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 997, 381 N.E.2d 1109. 
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of a firearm. 8 The principal witnesses for the prosecution, Trioli (the 
victim of the assault and battery) and Johnson (his companion), testified 
as immunized witnesses. Trioli and Johnson testified that the defendant 
instigated a scuffie in a barroom.9 When Trioli and Johnson attempted 
to escape, Jacobs allegedly followed them outside, drew a pistol, and 
fired several shots, wounding Trioli in both legs.10 The police encoun-
tered Trioli and Johnson shortly afterwards and, after sending them to 
the hospital, searched the area. The police found a pistol located under 
a car in the parking lot.H The only corroborative evidence offered 
against the defendant was the discovery of the gun near the scene of 
the shooting, police ballistic testimony that tended to prove the gun 
found in the parking lot had been fired whereas a gun found on Trioli 
had not, and the hospital record which confirmed Trioli's wounds and 
corroborated Trioli and Johnson's testimony that Trioli had been shot 
from behind.12 No testimony, other than that of the immunized wit-
nesses, connected the defendant to" the crime.13 
The Supreme Judicial Court concluded that there was sufficient cor-
roboration to satisfy section 201.14 The Court noted that, while other 
"corroboration" statutes in Massachusetts and elsewhere specifically re-
quire that the corroborating evidence link the defendant to the crime,15 
the language in section 201 is less explicit. 16 The purpose of the 
statute, the Court observed, is to insure the credibility of the testimony 
given by immunized witnesses.17 This goal can be accomplished, the 
Court noted, by requiring corroborative evidence on at least one ele-
ment of proof essential to convict the defendant.18 Following the 
standard established in DeBl'osky, the Court held that the corroborated 
element need not be the defendant's commission of the crime, but rather 
could be merely the manner in which the crime was committed.19 In 
the present case, the Court noted that the other evidence introduced-
the hospital record indicating that Trioli had been shot from behind 
and the police testimony that the weapon found had been fired-tended 
to corroborate the testimony of the immunized witnesses that an assault 
8 ld. at 997, 381 N.E.2d at 1110. 
9 ld. at 998, 381 N.E.2d at llll. 
10 ld. at 998-99, 381 N.E.2d at llll. 
11 ld. at 999, 381 N.E.2d at 11ll. 
12 ld. at 1001, 381 N.E.2d at ll12. 
13 ld. 
14 ld. at 1003, 381 N.E.2d at 1113. 
15 See, e.g., C.L. c. 264, § 4, concerning convictions for treason, and c. 272, § 11, 
relating to abductions of women for illicit purposes. 
16 1978 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1001, 381 N.E.2d at 1112. 
17 ld. 
18 ld. at 1001-02, 381 N.E. 2d at ll12. 
19 ld. at 1002, 381 N.E.2d at 1112. 
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and battery had been committed.20 As for the count of unlawful pos-
session of a firearm, the Court stated that the evidence that Trioli had 
been shot established the required element of knowing possession of a 
firearm. 21 Therefore, the Court concluded that corroborative evidence 
had been introduced on at least one element of each indictment.22 The 
defendant's appeal was thus denied. 
The significance of Jacobs is not that it establishes new law, but rather 
lies in the message that Jacobs makes painfully clear to the practical 
litigant-the protection afforded the defendant by section 201 is illusory. 
Indeed, a review of all reported decisions under section 201 does not 
reveal a single instance in which a defendant successfully raised the 
protection of section 201.23 In view of the DeBrosky standard and its 
application to a factual pattern such as Jacobs, it is difficult to conceive 
of a situation in which section 201 could be successfully invoked. In 
most of the cases arising to date, the immunized witness is an accom-
plice 24 and is consequently aware of the circumstances surrounding the 
commission of the crime. The prosecution can corroborate the witness 
merely by introducing extrinsic evidence showing the details of how 
the crime was committed.25 Similarly, if the witness is the victim, as in 
Jacobs, he will be aware of the details of the crime, and any evidence 
showing how the crime was committed, which substantiates the wit-
ness's version, will suffice. Even in the extreme case where the im-
munized witness's story is a complete fabrication, section 201 offers 
little protection: if a crime has been committed and the witness is 
20 ld. at 1003, 381 N.E.2d at 1112-13. 
21 ld. at 1003, 381 N.E.2d at 1113. 
22 ld. 
23 In addition to the DeBrosky and Jacobs cases, defendants have unsuccessfully 
sought protection under § 201 in the following cases: Commonwealth v. Stewart, 
1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1521,377 N.E.2d 693; Commonwealth v. Scanlon, 373 Mass. 11, 
364 N.E.2d 1196 (1977); Commonwealth v. Doyle, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 544, 364 
N.E.2d 1283 (1977); Commonwealth v. Turner, 371 Mass. 803, 359 N.E.2d 626 
( 1977); Commonwealth v. Donahue, 369 Mass. 943, 344 N.E.2d 886 (1976), cen. 
denied, 429 U.S. 833. There is, of course, the possibility that defendants have been 
successful in unreported trial court decisions on motions for .a directed verdict due 
to a lack of corroborating evidence. 
24 In all of the cases listed in note 23 supra the immunized witness was an 
accomplice who participated to some extent in the commission of the crime. 
25 For example, in Commonwealth v. Doyle, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 544, 364 N.E.2d 
1283 (1977), the defendant was convicted of procuring the burning of buildings. 
The immunized witness testified that the defendant solicited him to hum several 
buildings. The witness testified as to the dates and places of numerous fires he had 
started at the defendant's request. In addition, he testified that he used dura flame 
logs to start the fires. The court noted that the fire chief's testimony concerning the 
dates, locations, times, and in some instances the cause of the fire (the chief testified 
that pieces of dura flame logs were found at some of the fires) was sufficient cor-
roborative testimony to meet the requirements of § 201. ld. at 928, 364 N.E.2d at 
1287. 
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aware of the circumstances, any evidence corroborating the witness's 
version of how the crime occurred would satisfy the requirements of 
section 201. 
§4.9. Admissibility of Confession of a Co-defendant at a Joint Trial.· 
In Bruton v. United States, l the United States Supreme Court held that 
the confession of a co-defendant inculpating his fellow defendant was 
inadmissible in a joint triaJ.2 To reach this conclusion, the Court rea-
soned that as against the non-confessing defendant, the co-defendant's 
statement was inadmissible hearsay. a The Court determined that the 
defendant's sixth amendment rights to confrontation were violated by 
introduction of such unreliable information not subject to cross-examina-
tion.4 Additionally, the Court noted that a trial judge's instructions were 
insufficient to dissipate the prejudicial effect on jurors' minds which 
necessarily resulted from the co-defendant's confession.5 The Court 
reasoned that despite instructions to the contrary, jurors would continue 
to look to the incriminating extrajudicial statement when determining 
the defendant's guilt.6 Therefore, the Court concluded that the con-
fession was inadmissible.7 This rule has been only slightly modified 
since its adoption in Bruton. The Supreme Court has since held that a 
co-defend ant's confession is admissible at a joint trial in violation of 
the Bruton standard if the resulting error is harmless.8 
The Bruton rule focuses on the tension between the rights of the 
individual defendant and the state's interest in the swift and uncom-
§4.9 . ., By John D. Donovan, Jr., staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHU-
SEtTS LAW. 
1 391 U.S. 123 (1968). 
2 Id. at 126. See also 82 HARV. L. REV. 231 (1968). 
3 Id. at 125. Cf. FED. R. EVID. 802. 
4 Id. at 126. The sixth amendment requires that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, 
the accused shall enjoy the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him." 
The hearsay rule, FED. R. EVID. 802, is similarly premised on the introduction of 
unreliable testimony. 
5 391 U.S. at 129. 
6 Id. at 130 n.4. See also Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 
NEB. L. REv. 744, 753-55 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Broeder]. 
7 391 U.S. at 137, Bruton overruled Della Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232 
( 1957). In Della Paoli, the Court held that it was "reasonably possible for the 
jury to follow sufficiently clear instructions to disregard the confessors' statement 
incriminating the defendant." 352 U.S. at 239. Della Paoli's premise, however, 
had been effectively repudiated, albeit not expressly overruled, in Jackson v. Denno, 
378 U.S. 368 (1964). Denno rejected the proposition that jurors could ignore a 
confessor's statement of guilt in determining liability if it first found that the con-
fession was involuntary. As the Bruton Court later noted, Denno relied heavily on 
the dissenting opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Della Paoli. 
8 Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969). See also Chapman v. California, 
386 U.S. 18, 23-24 (1967) (establishing harmless error rule for constitutional viola-
lations). 
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plicated administration of justice. fl In the joint trial situation unique 
to American jurisprudence,lo these tensions become most acute, because 
the potential danger of admitting testimony against only one defendant 
and causing juror confusion is great. l1 In Bruton, the Supreme Court 
balanced this danger against the state's desire to conduct a joint trial 
of the defendants to the same crime. The Court noted that admitting 
the hearsay testimony of the co-defendant encroached on the sixth 
amendment right of confrontation 12 without a compensating means of 
preventing the jury's reliance on such incriminating, but unreliable, 
testimony. IS The Court observed that the historical assumption that 
jury instructions to disregard hearsay statements as to one defendant 
cured the danger of their admission had been effectively repudiated.14 
Admonitions to ignore the confessor's statement, the Court noted, were 
"intrinsically ineffective" 15 and could not erase the effect of the extra-
judicial declaration from the minds of the jurors.16 The Court therefore 
concluded that, in the joint trial situation, exclusion of such confessions 
was required,17 The Court thus insisted that prosecutors and trial 
judges either devote particular solicitude to the rights of the accused 
in a joint trial or prOvide a separate trial. The Court indicated, however, 
that its concern for protecting defendant's rights to confrontation in this 
context was limited to the joint trial.18 The Court emphasized that the 
admission of hearsay testimony did not, by itself, require reversal of 
convictions on sixth amendment grounds. III Rather, the Court suggested 
that only in the joint trial situation, when the inadmissible hearsay 
testimony directed the jury's attention inescapably at the defendant, was 
reversal absolutely necessary.20 
9 See 391 U.S. at 134. 
10 See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 773 (1946). 
11 See People v. Aranda, 63 Cal. 2d 518, 528-29, 407 P.2d 265, 271-72 (1965). 
The Supreme Court noted the Aranda case in Bruton. 391 U.S. at 130-31. 
12 391 U.S. at 126. 
181d. 
14 ld. 
111 ld. at 129. 
161d. 
17 ld. at 136-37. 
18 See 391 U.S. at 128 n.3. 
19 The Court noted: 
We emphasize that the hearsay statement inculpating petitioner was clearly 
inadmissable against him under traditional rules of evidence, . . . the problem 
arising only because the statement was . . . admissible against ... [the co-
defenaant]. . .. There is not before us, therefore, any recognized exception 
to the hearsay rule insofar as petitioner is concerned and we idtimate no view 
whatever that such exceptions neceSSarily raise questions under the Confrontation 
Clause. 
ld. 
20 ld. at 137. 
46
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1979 [1979], Art. 7
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1979/iss1/7
§4.9 EVIDENCE 127 
During the Survey year, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
had an opportunity to reconsider the Bruton rule.21 In Commonwealth 
v. Horton,22 the Court examined the Bruton rationale of excluding unre-
liable testimony in order to protect sixth amendment rights and the 
likely failure of curative instructions to jurors.23 The Court also con-
sidered the post-Bruton introduction of the harmless error doctrine.24 
In Horton, the Bruton rule was raised on an appeal of the conviction 
of three co-defendants for armed robbery and murder in the first de-
gree. 25 The three co-defendants had been arrested following the rob-
bery of a gas station during which the station attendant was fatally 
stabbed.26 At the police station, having been advised of his Miranda 
rights, each defendant gave a statement.2i The statements were made 
in the presence of the other defendants and the police officers conducting 
the interrogation.28 Although the substance of the statements differed,29 
each defendant admitted some involvement in the overall criminal en-
terprise.3o At trial, none of the three co-defendants testified.31 Police 
officers, however, were permitted to testify about the statements made 
21 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has considered the Bruton Rule 
several times since its adoption. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Carita, 356 Mass. 132, 
249 N.E.2d 5 (1969); Commonwealth v. Scott, 355 Mass. 471, 245 N.E.2d 415 
(1969); Commonwealth v. Lussier, 359 Mass. 393, 269 N.E.2d 647 (1971); Com-
monwealth v. Sarro, 356 Mass. 100, 248 N .E.2d 286 (1969); Commonwealth v. 
Craves, 363 Mass. 863, 299 N.E.2d 711 (1973); Commonwealth v. LeBlanc, 364 
Mass. 1, 299 N.E.2d 719 (1973); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 365 Mass. 149, 310 
N.E.2d 353 (1974); Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 364 Mass. 211, 303 N.E.2d 338 
(1973). See also 30 MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE, SMITH, CRIMINAL PRACTICE & PRO-
CEDURE, §§ 1021-1024 (1970) (Supp. 1979). 
22 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2548, 380 N.E.2d 687. 
23 Id. at 2557-59, 380 N.E.2d at 693-94. 
24 Id. at 2558, 380 N.E.2d at 694. 
25 Id. at 2556-57, 380 N.E.2d at 693. Defendants Horton, Pickett, and Wideman 
were convicted by a jury in the superior court, Essex County. Appeals were per-
fected and presented to the Supreme Judicial Court pursuant to C.L. c. 278, §§ 33A-
3.3C. 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2548, 380 N.E.2d at 690. 
26 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2551-52, 380 N.E.2d at 691. 
27 Id. at 2552-54, 380 N.E.2d at 691-92. 
28 Id. at 2552, 380 N.E.2d at 691. 
29 Defendant Horton admitted in his statement that he had stayed in the car 
while defendants Pickett and Wideman went into the station to rob the attendant. 
Defendant Pickett's statement averred that he (Pickett) had remained in the car 
while Horton and Wideman robbed the service station. Defendant Wideman es-
sentially repeated Pickett's version. 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 'at 2552-54, 380 N.E.2d at 
691-92. 
30 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2552-54, 380 N.E.2d at 691-92. Under the doctrines 
of felony-murder and joint enterprise, the statements referred to in note 29 supra 
would be sufficient to convict each of the defendants for murder in the first degree 
if properly admitted into evidence. C.L. c. 265, § 1. See also Commonwealth v. 
Connolly, 356 Mass. 617, 255 N.E.2d 191 (1970); Commonwealth v. Balliro, 349 
Mass. 505, 209 N.E.2d 308 (1965). 
31 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2557, 380 N.E.2d at 693. 
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by the co-defendants during interrogation.32 The motions of defendants' 
counsel to strike such testimony, and, alternatively, to sever the cases 
and conduct separate trials were denied.33 The jury was instructed on 
the doctrines of joint enterprise and felony murder 34 and returned guilty 
verdicts against all defendants.:!5 On appeal, among other issues,36 the 
defendants argued that the trial court's refusal to sever the cases while 
admitting the police officers' testimony about their confessions was re-
versible error under the Bruton rule.37 The Supreme Judicial Court 
disagreed,38 however, and affirmed the defendant's convictions.39 
On the issue of severing the trials, the Massachusetts Court initially 
examined the underlying premise of the Bruton standard. The Court 
realized that the principal focus of the Supreme Court's decision in 
Bruton was to prevent unfair and unreliable testimony from being used 
by the jury.40 The Supreme Judicial Court thus determined that an 
inquiry into the effect on the jurors' minds of the Horton defendants' 
statements must be made.41 Examining the Horton facts, the Court 
observed that the three co-defendants had all offered statements to the 
police admitting some involvement in the robbery of .the service station 
and the murder of the station attendant.42 The Court recognized that 
32 ld. 
33 ld. at 2556, 380 N.E.2d at 693. 
34 ld. at 2557-58, 380 N.E.2d at 694. See note 30 supra. 
35 ld. at 2555, 380 N.E.2d at 693. 
36 The three defendants collectively raised 591 exceptions at trial, and 135 ex-
ceptions at a postconviction hearing on motions for new trials. A total of 127 of 
these exceptions were presented to the Court in the assignment of errors, although 
only seven were actually argued. 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2556, 380 N.E.2d at 693. 
The Court treated the assignments of error not argued as waived pursuant to MASS. 
R.A.P. 16,367 Mass. 921 (1975); S.T.C. RULE 1:13, 366 Mass. 853 (1974). 1978 
Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2556, 380 N.E.2d at 693. The Court expressed its displeasure as 
well with the assignment of error and argument of defendant Horton, noting that 
his brief was "void of anything that can properly be called argument." 1978 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. at 2556 n.4, 380 N.E.2d at 693 n.4. The Court noted, however, that any 
valid contentions of Horton's were adequately addressed in the appropriate assign-
ments and arguments of Horton's co-defendants. ld. Among the other issues pre-
sented to the Court on appeal were (1) the means of examining prospective jurors, 
1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2560-66, 380 N.E.2d at 695-97; (2) admission of evidence 
of bloodstains not established as of human origin, id. at 2566-68, 380 N.E.2d at 697-
98; (3) admission of photographs of the deceased, id. at 2568-70, 380 N .E.2d at 698-
99; (4) failure to permit recross examination ofa witness, id. at 2570-71, 380 
N.E.2d at 699-700; (5) sufficiency of the e.vidence, id. at 2572, 380 N.E.2d at 700; 
and (6) motions for new trials on allegedly newly discovered evidence, ld. at 2572, 
380 N.E.2d at 700. 
87 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2557, 380 N.E.2d at 693. 
38 ld. at 2558-59, 380 N.E.2d at 694. 
39 ld. at 2574, 380 N.E.2d at 701. 
40 ld. at 2558, 380 N.E.2d at 694. 
41 ld. 
42 ld. at 2557, 380 N.E.2d at 694. 
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under the doctrines of felony murder and joint enterprise, upon which 
the jury had been instructed, the substantive inconsistencies of the three 
confessions were irrelevant.43 Since some involvement in the overall 
criminal act was admitted by each defendant, each statement served as 
an effective confession to the entire crime. The degree of each de-
fendant's culpability was unaffected by the inconsistent substantive 
aspect of his statement. 44 The Court thus concluded that since each 
defendant had admitted to participation in the crime, the jury would 
not improperly use one defendant's statement against another.45 
Having determined that juror prejudice would not result from ad-
mission of the separate confessions, the Court looked to the incriminat-
ing nature of each defendant's statement. The Bruton standard is vio-
lated, the Court pOinted out, when the extrajudicial confession of a co-
defendant is offered to inculpate his fellow defendant. 46 The Court 
noted that in the Horton case, however, the confessions were not di-
rectly inculpatory.47 The Court observed that none of the confessions 
of the defendants had any greater incriminating effect on the co-defend-
ants than the statements already made by those co-defendants.48 That 
is, the confessions merely served to corroborate independent evidence 
of criminal responsibility which the jury had received from the individual 
statements. The Court thus concluded that since the extrajudicial state-
ments of the co-defendants did not substantially implicate any defendant 
in a greater respect than each had already admitted, no violation of 
Bruton occurred.49 
Finally, the Court examined the cumulative effect of the admission 
of the confessions of the co-defendants upon each other. Once again, 
the Court noted that the incriminating effect of the statements' admis-
sion served only to corroborate the inculpating admissions already made 
by each defendant. 50 Thus, the Court determined that even if the con-
fessions were admitted erroneously under the Bruton standard, the error 
was harmless.51 Since each defendant would have been convicted upon 
the strength of his own statement alone, no prejudicial effect resulted 
from the admittance of the corroborative evidence. 52 Accordingly, the 
431d. 
44 ld. at 2558, 380 N.E.2d at 694. See note 30 supra. 
45 ld. See also Commonwealth v. Scott, 355 Mass. 471, 477-78, 245 N.E.2d 415, 
420 (1969). 
46 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2558, 380 N.E.2d at 694. 
47 ld. 
48 ld. See also Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 431-32 (1972). 
49 ld. 
50 ld. 
51 ld. 
52 ld. See note 30 supra. 
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Court held that any constitutional error committed by permitting the 
police officers to testify in violation of Bmton was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.53 
The result reached by the Court in Hotton is correct in its application 
of the Bruton rule. Unlike the Bruton defendants, the co-defendants in 
Horton each admitted some involvement in the robbery and killing of 
the station attendant. Their criminal responsibility thus established 
under the doctrines of joint enterprise and felony murder, the admission 
of the police officers' testimony did not violate confrontation rights secured 
by the sixth amendment. The danger perceived by the Supreme Court 
in Bruton was thus not apparent in the Horton case. Similarly, even if 
a violation of Bruton was made out, the Supreme Judicial Court correctly 
applied the harmless error doctrine. Since the admitted testimony 
merely corroborated confessions already made, the error of their ad-
mission was truly harmless. The risk that even a single juror might 
have changed his mind absent the arguably tainted evidence was ex-
tremely remote. 
While the Court thus applied the Bruton and harmless error rules 
correctly, it must be careful to scrutinize the facts of future cases when 
applying the doctrine again. In Horton, for example, had one of the 
co-defendants not made a statement during interrogation, or had one 
not admitted to some participation, the confessions would have been 
inadmissable under the Bruton doctrine. The solicitude which courts 
must accord criminal defendants in the joint trial situation demands that 
rights to confrontation and cross-examination be preserved. Under the 
fact pattern suggested above, admission of such testimony would violate 
the Bruton rule's insistence on such rights. Thus, as the Supreme Judi-
cial Court observed in a similar context, prosecutors must carefully con-
sider whether to introduce evidence of a co-defendant's confession or 
refrain from doing so or to conduct separate trials; failure to do so 
might make jOint trials futile.U4 Similarly, close examination of testimony 
admitted under Bmton is required for application of the harmless error 
doctrine. While the H orlon Court correctly viewed the co-defendants' 
statements as mere corroboration of each defendant's own confession, 
corroborative evidence may not always be harmless. Too much reliance 
on cumulative evidence subtly alters the quantum of proof required for 
criminal convictions. It is dangerous to apply a constitutional standard 
such as Bruton solely on the strength of the prosecutions case. To do 
so would transform the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard to one of 
"overwhelming evidence." This is not the intent of the Supreme Judicial 
Court in H orlon. 
53 ld. 
54 Commonwealth v. Scott, 355 Mass. 471, 478, 245 N.E.2d 415, 419 (1969). 
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§4.10. Competence of a Witness-Court Ordered Mental Examina-
tion-Evidence Required. <) In Massachusetts, the legislature has given 
the trial courts the discretionary authority to order a psychiatric examina-
tion of a witness in order to determine his or her competency to testify. 1 
The relevant statute provides that a judge may request the Department 
of Mental Health to appoint a psychiatrist to perform the examination.2 
In a case decided during the Survey year,3 the Supreme Judicial Court 
limited that discretion by stating that before he may order such an 
examination, a judge must have evidence of incompetency and further 
that evidence of mental illness is not necessarily evidence of a witness's 
incompetency.4 Furthermore, the Court ruled that if the judge decides 
that the evidence presented is sufficient to warrant ordering an involun-
tary psychiatric examination, he must specify to the psychiatrist the pur-
pose and scope of the examination in order to limit the invasion of the 
witness's privacy.5 
In Commonwealth v. Gibbons,6 the trial court ordered a rape victim 
to submit to a psychiatric examination before testifying. The defendant 
had moved for a psychiatric examination of the complainant pursuant 
to chapter 123, section 19 of the General Laws.7 In support of the mo-
tion, the defense counsel asserted that the complainant had a history of 
mental illness, that she had been under the care of a psychiatrist for 
two years, and that she might be likely to "make up things." 8 He 
added that the defendant's probable cause hearings had been delayed 
due to the complainant's mental problems and that cross-examination at 
the probable cause hearings had been curtailed for the same reason.9 
The commonwealth acknowledged that the complainant witness had a 
history of mental illness and offered to make her medical records avail-
able to the defense if the judge thought it warranted.10 The common-
wealth claimed, however, that the cross-examination of the complainant 
§4.10. " By Louise M. Gessel, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
LAW. 
1 G.L. c. 123, § 19. The statute reads: "In order to determine the mental con-
dition of any party or witness before any court of the commonwealth, the presiding 
judge may, in his discretion, request the department [of Mental Health] to assign a 
qualified physician, who, if assigned shall make such examinations as the judge 
may deem necessary." Id. 
2 Id. 
3 Commonwealth v . .Gibbons, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2168, 393 N.E.2d 400. 
4 Id. at 2173, 393 N.E.2d at 403. 
5 Id. at 2176, 393 N.E.2d at 405. 
6 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2168, 393 N.E.2d 400. 
7 Id. at 2169, 393 N.E.2d at 402. See note 1 supra, for the test of G.L. c. 123, 
§ 19. 
8 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2169, 393 N.E.2d at 402. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 2169-70, 393 N.E.2d at 402. 
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at the probable cause hearings had been halted not because the witness 
was suffering from mental or emotional problems but because the de-
fense counsel was harassing the witness.ll 
The trial judge decided, on the basis of the defense counsel's asser-
tions, that a psychiatric examination of the witness was warranted and 
asked the defendant to recommend a psychiatrist.12 The defendant 
agreed to submit names of psychiatrists to the judge, who "guessed" it 
was "appropriate" to have the defendant select the psychiatrist, thinking 
this method would ensure the selection of an "independent" psychiatrist,13 
After the complainant declined to submit to an examination by a psy-
chiatrist selected by the defendant, the judge dismissed the indictment.14 
The Supreme Judicial Court, reversed the decision of the lower court 
dismiSSing the indictment,15 finding that the trial judge's request that 
the defendant, rather than the Department of Mental Health, select the 
psychiatrist was a clear error of law.16 The Court also found that there 
was no evidentiary basis to justify the trial court's order that the wit-
ness submit to an involuntary psychiatric examination on the issue of 
competency.17 The Court concluded that some evidence of incompetency 
is required before a judge may order an involuntary psychiatric examina-
tion. If the judge himself has doubts about a witness's competency, the 
Court suggested that the judge hold a voir dire examination of the wit-
ness, examine the witness's medical records, or procure statements from 
the witness's psychiatrist before ordering a section 19 examination.18 
When conflicting statements or unsupported allegations are offered in 
support of a motion for an involuntary psychiatric examination, the 
Court stated that an evidentiary hearing should be held to determine 
if there is a compelling need for such an examination.19 The Court also 
noted that when a court-ordered psychiatric examination is warranted, 
the language of section 19 requires that the judge guide the Department 
11 ld. at 2170, 393 N .E.2d at 402. At a hearing on the defendant's motion to 
dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the district court judge improperly re-
stricted cross examination of the complainant at the probable cause hearings, a 
superior court judge ruled that there had been no error and that cross examination 
had been limited because the "defense counsel was engaged in harassment of the 
witness." ld. at n.4. 
12 ld. at 2170, 393 N.E.2d at 402. 
131d. 
14 ld. 
15 ld. at 2169, 393 N.E.2d at 402. 
16 ld. at 2171, 393 N.E.2d at 403. See C.L. c. 123, § 19, supra note 1. The 
statute states that a judge may "request the der,mment to assign a qualified physi-
cian." ld. Section 1 of chapter 23 defines • department" as the Department of 
Mental Health. C.L. c. 123, § 1. 
17 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2172-73, 393 N.E.2d at 403. 
18 ld. at 2173-74, 393 N.E.2d at 404. 
19 ld. at 2175, 393 N.E.2d at 404-05. 
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of Mental Health by specifying the scope and purpose of the examina-
tion.20 
In reaching its conclusion, the Gibbons Court reviewed the standard 
governing the competence of a witness. The Court noted that earlier 
Massachusetts cases had stated that competence depends not on sanity 21 
but on the awareness of a duty to tell the truth,22 personal knowledge 
of the facts, and an ability to perceive, remember, and recount the 
facts. 23 Under this standard, there was no evidence in Gibbons to show 
that the witness was not competent to testify.24 
The Court emphasized that the decision to order a psychiatric examina-
tion of a witness must be based on informed discretion, which implies 
an "absence of arbitrary determination, capricious disposition, or whim-
sical thinking." 25 The Court appeared to propose a balancing test to 
determine whether there is a compelling need for a psychiatriC examina-
tion.26 Factors to be weighed against the need for a psychiatric exami-
nation include the invasion of privacy and the possibility of harassment 
of a witness subjected to an involuntary psychiatric examination 27 as 
well as the likelihood that such an examination aChIally would produce 
substantial evidence bearing on the witness's testimonial capacity.28 
The Gibbons Court specifically noted that in a case of rape, such as 
this one, the trauma of a rape may be increased by subjection to an 
involuntary psychiatriC examination.29 The Court also made it clear that 
20 ld. at 2176, 393 N.E.2d at 405. The language referred to is "such examinations 
as the. judge may deem necessary." C.L. c. 123, § 19. 
21 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2173, 393 N.E.2d at 403. See Commonwealth v. 
Zelenski, 287 Mass. 125, 129, 191 N .E. 355, 357 (1934). 
22 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2172, 393 N.E.2d at 403. See Commonwealth v. 
Welcome, 348 Mass. 68, 70, 201 N.E.2d 827, 828 (1964). 
23 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2172, 393 N.E.2d at 403. See generally W. LEACH & 
P. LIACOS, MASSACHUSETTS EVIDENCE 135 (4th ed. 1967); C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 
§ 62, at 140 (2d ed. 1972). 
24 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2172-73, 393 N.E.2d at 403. 
25 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2174, 383 N.E.2nd at 404 (quoting Davis v. Boston 
Elevated Ry., 235 Mass. 482, 496,126 N.E. 841, 844 (1920». 
26 See 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2176, 383 N.E.2d at 405. 
27 ld. 
28 ld. See Ballard v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. 2d 159, 174-75 n.lO, 410 P.2d 838, 
848 n.lO, 49 Cal. Rptr. 302, 312 n.1O (1966) (discussing problems involved in 
judging a witness's competence through psychiatric examinations); Note, 67 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1137, 1143 (1967). The Gibbons Court also acknowledged that an un-
cooperative patient cannot be satisfactorily examined by a psychiatrist. 1979 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. at 2171, 383 N.E.2d at 402. 
29 ld. at 2176, 393 N .E.2d at 405 ("[T]he trauma that attends the role of com-
plainant to sex offense charges is sharply increased by the indignity of a psychiatric 
examination; the examination itself could serve as a tool of harassment.") (quoting 
United States v. Benn, 476 F.2d 1127, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 1973». 
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in Massachusetts, contrary to the argument of the defense counsel in 
this case, involuntary psychiatric examinations are not more appropriate 
in rape cases than in other criminal cases.30 
The Court's decision in Gibbons is based on an awareness that a court-
ordered psychiatric examination constitutes an invasion of privacy that 
should not be undertaken without a showing of compelling need. Al-
though earlier Massachusetts decisions have established that sanity is 
not the test of competence to testify, the Gibbons decision is the first 
to articulate the requirements of actual evidence of incompetence-a 
showing of an inability to understand the duty to tell the truth and to 
remember and recount facts-before a court may order a witness to 
submit to an involuntary psychiatric examination on that issue. 
§4.1l. Admissibility of Photographs of Homicide Victims.o One 
issue in homicide trials which continues to plague the Supreme Judicial 
Court is the admissibility of potentially inflammatory photographs of 
the murder victim. It is a well-established rule in Massachusetts that 
"[t]he fact that photographs may be inflammatory does not render them 
inadmissible if they possess evidential value on a material matter." 1 The 
determination of admissibility remains an issue almost solely within the 
sound discretion of the trial court judge.2 
30 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2177, 393 N.E.2d at 405. This decision is apparently in 
contrast to the traditional view that all rape complainants should be subjected to 
psychiatric scrutiny before appearing before a jury. See 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 
§ 924a (1970), which states: "No judge should ever let a sex offense charge go 
to the jury unless the female complainant's social history and mental make up have 
been examined and testified to by a qualified physician." ld. at 737. This is 
necessary, Wigmore says, because the female "unchaste . . . mentality" often finds 
expression in the narration of imaginary sex incidents, and "[tlhe real victim ... 
too often in such cases is the innocent man; for the respect and sympathy naturally 
felt by any tribunal for a wronged female helps to give easy credit to such a plausible 
tale." ld. at 736. Although this statement appears in the most recent edition of 
Wigmore, jurisdictions that have recently addressed the issue have declined to follow 
this policy. See, e.g., Ballard v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. 2d 159, 175, 410 P.2d 838, 
849, 49 Gal. Rptr. 302, 313 (1966). See generally O'Neale, Court Ordered Psy-
chiatric Examination of a Rape Victim in a Criminal Prosecution-Or How Many 
Times Must a Woman Be Raped?, 18 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 119 (1978). 
§4.11. " By Daniel E. Wright, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHU-
SETTS LAW. 
1 Commonwealth v. Horton, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2548, 2568-69, 380 N.E.2d 
687, 698 (quoting Commonwealth v. Stewart, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1521, 1526, 377 
N.E.2d 693, 697). See also Commonwealth v. Lamoureux, 348 Mass. 390, 392-93, 
204 N.E.2d 115, 117 (1965); Commonwealth v. McCarty, 323 Mass. 435, 438, 82 
N.E.2d 603, 606 (1948). 
2 Commonwealth v. Sperrazza, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2423, 2427, 396 N.E.2d 
449, 452; Commonwealth v. Stewart, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1521, 1526, 377 N.E.2d 
693, 697-98; Commonwealth v. Jones, 373 Mass. 423, 426, 367 N.E.2d 631, 633 
(1977); Commonwealth v. Bys, 370 Mass. 350, 357-61, 348 N:E.2d 431, 436-39 
(1976). 
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The cases decided by the Court prior to the Survey year addressed 
the scope of the trial judge's discretion to admit gruesome photographs.3 
In Commonwealth v. Bys,4 a homicide case in which an intended rape 
victim was beaten about the head and face with a tire iron,5 the de-
fendant contended that the photographs and slides admitted by the trial 
court were extremely graphic and gruesome portrayals of death which 
could only trigger "an unwarranted sense of rebellion . . . and prevent 
a dispassionate and even tempered review by a jury." 6 The Court 
wholly rejected the defendant's contention. It noted that through a 
long line of decisions it has held that if photographs and slides depicting 
murders of extreme atrocity or cruelty are otherwise admissible, they 
will not be rendered "inadmissible solely because they are gruesome or 
may have an inflammatory effect on the jury." 7 The Bys Court there-
fore held that the trial court judge did not abuse his discretion by 
admitting the photographs and slides since they had probative value on 
the issues in the case.8 The Court further stated that a defendant who 
claims an abuse of discretion by the trial judge in admitting photographs 
assumes a heavy burden: 
On appellate review of a claim of an abuse of discretion by a trial 
judge, "[t]he question is not whether we ... should have made an 
opposite decision from that made by the trial judge. To sustain 
. . . the claim it is necessary to decide that no conscientious judge, 
acting intelligently, could honestly have taken the view expressed 
by him." 9 
Thus, the Bys Court apparently sought to limit the number of appeals 
on this issue. 
A few months after the Bys decision, in an unusual case, the Court 
reversed a lower court conviction for murder where the trial judge ad-
mitted gruesome photographs. In Commonwealth v. Richmond 10 the 
photographs allowed into evidence showed severe mutilation of the 
victim's face which was not inflicted by the defendant. In that case, 
the corpse had been left in a snow bank for five days prior to its dis-
covery.n The face of the corpse was severely mutilated by dogs before 
3 Corrunonwealth v. Richmond, 371 Mass. 563, 358 N.E.2d 9.99 (1976); Com-
monwealth v. Bys, 370 Mass. 350, 348 N.E.2d 431 (1976). See Dushman, Evidence, 
1977 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 7.3, at 137-38. 
4 370 Mass. 350, 348 N.E.2d 431 (1976). 
5 ld. at 353 & 355-56, 348 N.E.2d at 434 & 435-36. 
6 ld. at 357, 348 N.E.2d at 437. 
7 ld. at 358, 348 N.E.2d at 437. 
8 ld. at 358 & 361, 348 N.E.2d at 437 & 439. 
9 ld. at 361, 348 N.E.2d at 439. 
10 371 Mass. 563, 358 N.E.2d 999 (1976). 
11 ld. at 563, 358 N.E.2d at 1000. 
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it was retrieved by state authorities.12 Over the objection of defense 
counsel, the trial judge admitted the photographs showing the post-
mortem mutilation.13 The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the lower 
court conviction because "the evidential value of the photographs which 
went to the jury was overwhelmed by the prejudicial effect." 14 The 
Court, however, was quick to emphasize that unusual circumstances must 
exist for it to find an abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to 
admit photographs of homicide victims.15 
During the Survey year, three cases decided by the Supreme Judicial 
Court further elucidate the standard for determining which photographs 
will be admissible in homicide trials. In Commonwealth v. Horton,16 
the defendant was convicted of the first-degree murder of a service sta-
tion attendant who had been stabbed in the neck, chest, and other areas 
of the body and then placed in an office trash can.17 The police moved 
the body from the trash can to the office Hoor in an effort to locate 
a pulse in the victim. IS The photograph admitted by the trial court 
"depicted the body, the general area of the office, loose change on the 
Hoor, and blood at the victim's head and feet, and on the office wall." 19 
On appeal, the defendant argued that movement of the body by the 
police weakened the probative value of the photograph since the posi-
tioning of the victim's body on the office Hoor was not an act of the 
defendant.20 
The Court rejected .the argument. The Court distinguished the Rich-
mond case, which had found error in admitting photographs of post-
mortem injuries not inHicted by the defendant.21 In Horton, the post-
mortem movement of the victim's body did not inHict any injury to the 
corpse which might have been prejudicial. Although the movement of 
the victim in Horton may have slightly changed the murder scene de-
picted in the photographs, it was within the trial judge's discretion to 
admit the photographs if they still appeared to b.e helpful for the jury.22 
12 ld. at 563-64, 358 N .E.2d at 1000. 
13 ld. at 565, 358 N.E.2d at 1000. 
14 ld.at 565, 358 N.E.·2d at 100!. 
15 ld. at 566,358 N.E.2d at 1001. The Court cautioned: 
. . . we have never, so far as we know, upset a verdict on this type of error, 
and this opinion is not to be taken to indicate that we are likely to do so 
again, but there are limits to the employment of judicial discretion and those 
limits were exceeded in this instance. 
ld. 
16 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2548, 380 N.E.2d 687. 
17 ld. at 2549 & 2568, 380 N.E.2d at 690 & 698. 
18 ld. at 2568, 380 N.E.2d at 698. 
19 ld. 
20ld. 
21 ld. at 2569-70, 380 N.E.2d at 699. 
22 ld. at 2569, 380 N.E.2d at 699. "The fact that the body was moved from its 
'slumped' and 'contorted' position in the trash can onto the Hoor in order to take a 
56
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1979 [1979], Art. 7
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1979/iss1/7
§4.1l EVIDENCE 137 
In Commonwealth v. Allen,23 reversed on other grounds, the Court in 
dicta suggested that photographs which depict post-mortem decomposi-
tion which might cause jury speculation about possible sexual overtones 
of the crime should be carefully examined by the trial judge for potential 
prejudice.24 The photographs admitted by the trial court in Allen de-
picited not only head injuries caused by the defendant's assault but also 
bloody staining around the crotch which resulted entirely from natural 
post mortem decomposition.25 The commonwealth's evidence showed 
that the homicide resulted solely from the defendant beating the victim 
about the head with a hammer.2o The woman's body was in a state of 
moderately advanced decomposition two days after the killing when her 
body was discovered and photographed as evidence.27 The Court de-
clined to reverse the trial court's decision to admit the photographs, be-
cause it found that they had evidential value in showing the nature of 
the viotim's wounds, even though they also depicted some post-mortem 
deterioration.28 Despite its failure to reverse on this issue, the Court 
strongly suggested that the photographs of the victim's bloody crotch 
were of questionable value. "[W]e do suggest that on retrial the judge 
scrutinize such photographs carefully to determine whether the possess 
evidentiary value of sufficient magnitude to outweigh their inherently 
inHammatory nature." 29 In a concurring opinion, Justice Wilkins stated 
that the admission of these photographs was reversible error in any 
event.30 
Like the Allen case, Commonwealth v. Sperrazza 31 involved the ad-
missibility of photographs depicting both injury inHicted by the defend-
ant and post-mortem decomposition. In contrast to Allen, however, the 
Supreme Judicial Court in Sperrazza affirmed without discussion the trial 
court's decision to admit the photographs depicting evidence of both the 
pulse and that the picture was taken in this latter pOSition does not defeat the 
photograph's probative value." ld. 
23 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 863, 387 N.E.2d 553 
24 ld. at 871, 387 N.E.2d at 557. 
25 ld. at 869, 387 N.E.2d at 556. 
26 ld. at 864, 387 N.E.2d at 555. 
27 ld. at 869, 387 N.E.2d at 556. 
28 ld. at 870, 387 N.E.2d at 557. The Court noted: "All of the injuries inflicted 
on the victim were head injuries; there was no suggestion by the Commonwealth that 
the defendant committed any sexual acts or any violent 'acts other than the blows 
totha head of the victim." ld. at 869, 387 N.E.2d at 556. 
29 ld. at 871, 387 N.E.2d at 557. 
30 ld. at 873, 387 N.E.2d at 558. Justice Wilkins stated: 
... the admission of some of the photographs calls for a new trial in any event. 
Prosecutors should exercise restraint in offering inflammatory photographs of 
minimum relevance or, as here, of no relevance at all. If such restraint is not 
employed, judges should exercise their discretion to exclude such photographs. 
ld. 
31 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2423, 396 N.E.2d 449. 
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murder and ordinary decomposition of the bodies.32 In Sperrazza, the 
bodies of the murder victims had been buried in a shallow grave for two 
and one-half years before they were discovered.33 Although the opinion 
does not specifically state that the pictures of the victims depicted both 
evidence of the murder and post-mortem decomposition, the Court's use 
of the word "remains" in reference to the victims' bodies certainly implies 
that the photographs showed the corpses in an advanced state of decom-
position.34 The type of decomposition involved in the Allen case, unlike 
that in Sperrazza, could have caused unjustified and prejudical specula-
tion by the jury that the bloody crotch resulted from an act by the 
defendant. Apparently the Court did not find that the decomposition 
involved in Sperrazza presented an Allen type of situation where the 
photographed decomposition could have misled the jury into prejudicial 
speculation. 
These cases delineate the parameters of trial court discretion in the 
admission of homicide victim's photographs. By its one sentence affirm-
ance in Sperrazza, the Supreme Judicial Court apparently has indicated 
that it considers this issue well settled. The Bys and Horton cases repre-
sent the most recent statements by the Court that the admissibility of 
photographs and slides of the murder victim will remain within the 
sound discretion of the trial court judge and that a plaintiff who attempts 
to overturn a conviction upon the claim of abuse of discretion assumes a 
heavy burden. Richmond and Allen articulate the circumstances in 
which admission of murder victim photographs should be denied. A 
trial judge abuses his discretion when he permits the admission of a 
photograph which depicts (a) an injury for which the defendant was 
not responsible or (b) a condition which creates a clearly prejudicial 
effect upon the jury or suggests to the jury a crime which did not occur. 
Thus, reversal for improper admission of photographs of murder victims 
will not likely be granted in any but the clearest case of abuse of judicial 
discretion as carefully delineated by the Court in the Richmond and 
Allen cases. 
§4.12. Privileges-Husband-Wife and Attorney-Client Communica-
tions.o During the 1979 Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court in 
32 The entire extent of the discussion of the admissibility of the murder photo-
graphs in Sperrazza was as follows: "c. The admission in evidence of photographs 
of the victims' bodies rests in the sound discretion of the judge." ld. at 2427, 396 
N.E.2d at 452. 
33 ld. at 2424, 396 N.E.2d at 451. 
34 ld. The Court stated "[M]ore than two and one-half years after they dis-
appeared, their remains were found buried in a wooded area .... " ld. 
§4.12. " By Clover M. Drinkwate.r-Lunn, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF 
MASSACHUSETI'S LAW. 
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Commonwealth v. O'Brien 1 addressed two questions concerning the 
admissibility of privileged conversations. In O'Brien the defendant fa-
tally shot his wife at the office of his attorney, Ralph Champa.2 The 
shooting occurred during a heated discussion concerning a separation 
agreement and a divorce. 3 The defendant did not deny that he shot his 
wife but asserted that he was not criminally responsible for his act.4 
At trial, over the defendant's objections, attorney Champa was per-
mitted to testify to certain conversations which took place in his office 
both before and after the shooting.5 Champa recounted the conversa-
tion between defendant and his wife which occurred immediately before 
the shooting.6 He testified that there had been an argument, during 
which the defendant had said to his wife, "You're not leaving here 
alive." 7 He further testified that defendant then pulled a gun from his 
pocket and said, "You're dead, Lorraine." 8 In order to show the defend-
ant's state of mind, attorney Champa was also permitted to testify that 
several minutes after the shooting, the defendant asked him, "Will you be 
my lawyer?" 9 A jury subsequently found defendant guilty of first degree 
murder.10 
On appeal defendant argued that both of these items of testimony 
should have been excluded. He claimed that Champa's testimony con-
cerning the conversation between himself and his wife was privileged 
under C.L. c. 233, § 20,11 as a private conversation between husband and 
wife.12 Defendant further argued that the attorney's testimony as to 
defendant's request for legal representation was inadmissible as a priv-
iliged communication between client and attorney.13 The Supreme 
Judicial Court concluded that neither of these conversations was covered 
by the privileges asserted by the defendant.14 
In addressing the issue of the conversation between the defendant and 
his wife, the Supreme Judicial Court first noted that the spousal privilege 
1 1979 Mass. Adv. 5h. 985, 388 N.E.2d 658. 
2 ld. at 985, 388 N.E.2d at 660. 
3 ld. 
41d. 
5 ld. at 987, 388 N.E.2d at 661. 
6 ld. at 986, 388 N.E.2d at 661. 
7 ld. at 996, 388 N.E.2d at 665. 
8 ld. 
9 ld. at 987, 388 N.E.2d at 661. 
10 ld. at 985, 388 N.E.2d at 660. 
11 C.L. c. 233, § 20. The statute provided that except in actions for enforcement 
of support and actions for desertion and nonsupport "neither husband nor wife 
shall testify as to private conversations with the other." ld. 
12 1979 Mass. Adv. 5h. at 986, 388 N.E.2d at 661. 
13 ld. at 987, 388 N.E.2d at 661. 
14 ld. at 986, 988, 388 N.E.2d at 661. 
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did not apply because the conversation took place in the presence of a 
third party.15 A discussion between husband and wife that occurs in 
the presence of a third party is not private.16 The Court found Champa 
to be a third party and held that his status as defendant's attorney did 
not change the situation.17 Secondly, the Court ruled that the discussion, 
which involved abuse and threats, was not the type of private conversa-
tion which the spousal privilege statute aimed to protect.18 Finally, the 
Court noted that the statute19 bars only a husband and a wife from testi-
fying as to private conversations.20 This prohibition does not extend to 
testimony by a third party with respect to such conversations.21 Thus, 
the Court concluded that defendant's remarks to his wife did not fall 
within the scope of the statutory private conversation disqualification.22 
After holding that there was no error in admitting the attorney's testi-
mony concerning the defendant's conversation with his wife, the Court 
considered whether the trial court erred in permitting Champa to testify 
as to defendant's request for legal representation.23 The Court acknowl-
edged at the outset that the attorney-client privilege may extend to pre-
liminary conversations concerning representation even if representation 
is never undertaken.24 The Court noted, however, that since the priv-
ilege runs contrary to the interest in full disclosure of relevant informa-
tion, the privilege should be narrowly construed.25 If a request for rep-
resentation is confidential, testimony concerning such a request may be 
excluded. Confidentiality in such situations will not be presumed, how-
ever, but must be determined from the circumstances.26 The Court 
agreed that where the seeking of legal representation could be construed 
as evidence of consciousness of guilt, the mere fact of a request for 
representation could be found to be confidentiaJ.27 Under such circum-
stances, the fact of the request might be protected.28 The Court found 
that in the present case the defendant's need for legal representation 
was obvious from the circumstances, as the defendant's arrest was im-
15 ld. at 986-87, 388 N.E.2d at 661. 
16 ld. at 987, 388 N.E.2d at 661. 
171d. 
18 ld. 
19 See note 11 supra. 
20 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 987, 388 N.E.2d at 661. 
21 ld. 
22 ld. at 986, 388 N.E.2d at 661. 
23 ld. at 987, 388 N.E.2d at 661. Prosecution sought admission of the statement 
as evidence of defendant's state of mind. ld. 
24 ld. 
211 ld. 
26 ld. at 988, 388 N.E.2d at 661. 
27 ld. 
281d. 
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minent.29 It reasoned, therefore, that the defendant's request for repre-
sentation could not have been intended as confidential,3° The Court 
concluded that since no confidentiality was intended, this particular com-
munication between defendant and his attorney was not privileged.31 
Thus, the Court held that there was no error in admitting the attorney's 
testimony.32 
The Court's ruling on the evidentiary issues in O'Brien is consistent 
with the Court's prior decisions with respect to both spousal and attorney-
client privileges. In its interpretations of C.L. c. 233, § 20, the Supreme 
Judicial Court consistently has held that to come within the ambit of 
the privilege, a conversation between husband and wife must be private. 
A spousal conversation held in the presence of a third party or overheard 
by a third party is not considered to be private. 33 For instance, a con-
versation between spouses in the presence of children is not private if 
the children are old enough to pay attention and compreherid what is 
said. 34 Furthermore, even conversations between husband and wife 
while physically alone have been held admissible when overheard by 
the occupants of a neighboring apartment. 35 In O'Brien the conversation 
clearly was not private because a third party, the defendant's attorney, 
was present. 36 In addition, Champa's status as an attorney could not 
alter the situation because he was not representing both parties.37 Fur-
thermore, it was not the spouse who. was testifying but the third party, 
and the statute in question is concerned only with testimony by a 
spouse.38 Thus, it is not unexpected that the Court on these grounds 
found that the privilege did not apply. 
In addition to declining to apply the husband-wife privilege because 
a third party was present, the Supreme Judicial Court has also previously 
declined to apply the privilege where the remarks from one spouse to 
another were abusive or threatening. In Commonwealth v. Gillis,39 the 
trial of a husband for assault with intent to murder, the Court upheld 
the admission of wife's testimony that husband had said to her, "I am 
29 Id. 
30Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Commonwealth v. Stokes, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 610, 625, 374 N.E.2d 87, 95; 
Martin v. Martin, 267 Mass. 157, 159,166 N.E. 820,820 (1929); Freeman v. Free-
man, 238 Mass. 150, 161, 130 N.E. 220, 222 (1921). 
34 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 625, 374 N.E.2d at 95; 238 Mass. at 161, 130 N.E. 
at 222. 
35 267 Mass. at 159, 166 N.E. at 820. 
36 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 986-87, 338 N.E.2d at 661. 
37 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2312 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). 
38 C.L. c .. 233, § 20. See note 11 supra. 
39 358 Mass. 215, 263 N.E.2d 437 (1970). 
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going to kill you," after she had told him she wanted a divorce.40 The 
Court reasoned that the policy concerns underlying the statutory exclu-
sion of private marital conversations would not extend to words constitut-
ing abuse and threats.41 It concluded that threatening words do not 
have any confidential aspect within the purpose of the protection.42 
O'Brien presented a situation very similar to that in Gillis. In this 
case, the defendant threatened to kill his wife and in fact did so almost 
simultaneously with the threats. Therefore, in upholding admission of 
the attorney's testimony as to defendant's remarks to his wife, the Court 
reaffirmed its holding in Gillis. 
Similarly, the O'Brien Court's decision that there was no attorney-
client privilege is consistent with prior Massachusetts decisions. Rea-
soning along lines analagous to those employed in assessing the applica-
tion of the husband-wife privilege, the Supreme Judicial Court had held, 
prior to O'Brien, that the attorney-client privilege extends only to com-
munications intended to be confidential. The Court has ruled that com-
munications made between attorney and client with the understanding 
that they would be conveyed to third parties are not confidential and 
therefore not privileged.43 In Peters v. Wallach,44 a suit in equity to 
enforce an agreement to settle a prior suit, the Court approved admission 
of counsel's testimony that he had been authorized by his client to settle 
the case.45 It found the circumstances indicated that this information 
was clearly intended to be communicated to others and as such was not 
privileged.46 In Commonwealth v. Michel,47 the Court, on the same 
. reasoning, upheld the admission of a witness's testimony that he had 
been told by his attorney of the prosecutor's offer not to prosecute further 
the indictments against him in return for certain testimony.48 The Court 
pOinted out that the offer was necessarily already known to one third 
party, the prosecutor, and would likely become part of the court record.49 
In keeping with these decisions, the O'Brien Court found confidentiality 
lacking when the defendant asked Champa to represent him. It reasoned 
that he could not have intended his need for legal representation to be 
kept confidential, since it was obvious from the circumstances. Thus, 
the O'Brien Court, in holding that lack of confidentiality in attorney-client 
40 ld. at 215, 263 N.E.2d at 438. 
41 ld. at 218, 263 N.E.2d at 440. 
421d. 
43 Conunonwealth v. Michel, 367 Mass. 454, 460, 327 N.E.2d 720, 724 (1975). 
44 366 Mass. 622, 321 N.E.2d 806 (1975). 
45 ld. at 627, 321 N.E.2d at 809. 
46 ld. 
47 367 Mass. 454, 327 N.E.2d 720 (1975). 
48 ld.at 460, 327 N.E.2d at 724. 
49 ld. at 461, 327 N.E.2d at 724. 
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communications could be inferred from the circumstances under which 
the communications were made, followed its earlier decisions. 
While the evidentiary rulings of O'Brien and prior decisions do con-
stitute limitations on the applicability of the spousal and attorney-client 
privileges, these limitations are consistent with the policies which underlie 
these privileges. In both cases the goal of the privileges is the protection 
of special relationships.50 The rationale behind affording protection to 
private marital conversations is the need to encourage marital confidences, 
which confidences in turn promote marital harmony. 51 The attorney-
client privilege is based on the view that an attorney can act effectively 
on behalf of a client only if fully advised by his client of all pertinent 
facts and that the privilege is necessary to encourage such disclosure.52 
Permitting disclosure of one spouse's threat to kill the other in no way 
impairs the preservation of marital harmony, since marital harmony 
clearly is lacking to begin with. Likewise, allOwing an attorney in the 
circumstances of the O'Brien ease to testify that immediately following 
shooting his wife the defendant asked the attorney to represent him 
should not inhibit clients in the future from making full disclosure to 
their attorneys. Thus, in neither instance should the limitations imposed 
by .o'Brien on the application of the spousal and attorney-client privileges 
defeat the ultimate goals which these privileges are designed to advance. 
50 Wigmore identifies four factors which should be at the foundation of any 
privileged communication: ( 1) The communications originate in confidence. (2) 
The confidence is essential to the relation. ( 3) The relation is a proper object of 
encouragement by the law. And (4) the injury that would inure to' it by disclosure 
is probably greater than the benefit that would result in the judicial investigation 
of the truth. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2285 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). 
51 C. MCCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 86 (2d ed. 1972). 
52 Id. at § 87. 
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